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My doctoral research contributes to the fields of macroeconomics and interna-
tional finance. Within macroeconomics, I have explored the role of financial frictions
in shaping macroeconomic outcomes following a recession. I have studied the dis-
sonance between the rapid improvement in financial conditions and the sluggish
recovery in investment observed in the aftermath of the Great Recession. In related
research I also analyze the fast improvement in financial conditions and analyze the
existence of a positive feedback between asset prices and leverage through the lens
of liquidity shocks. Within international finance, I have an empirical and theoret-
ical interest in the analysis of capital flows. My research in this area has focused
on the role of domestic investors in preventing economies from experiencing the
largely-documented pervasive effects of net sudden stops in capital flows, and its
determinants.
Chapter 1. The rapid improvement in financial conditions and the sluggish recov-
ery of physical investment in the aftermath of the Great Recession are difficult to
reconcile with the predictions of existing models that link impaired access to credit
and investment. I propose a tractable model that solves this puzzle by exploiting
the role of customer markets in shaping the persistent effects of financial shocks
on investment decisions. In my model, firms react to a negative financial shock by
reducing expenditures in sales-related activities and increasing prices to restore in-
ternal liquidity, at the expense of customer accumulation. Once financial conditions
start reverting to normal levels, the firm postpones investment due to a shortage
of customers relative to its existing production capacity and the need to first re-
build its customer base. This mechanism can capture two important features of the
data: First, the slow recovery of investment despite improving financial conditions,
and second, the positive correlation between financial conditions and investment
observed during downturns and the weakening of this correlation observed during
upturns.
Chapter 2. I assess how the inclusion of complementary sources of liquidity can
have sizeable reinforcing effects during a crisis and in its aftermath. In this paper,
I allow for the possibility to finance investment projects either by selling existing
capital units or by borrowing using the units not sold as collateral. The main
characteristic of this model is that capital is heterogeneous and composed by units of
different quality, which are only observed by the owner. The asymmetric information
on capital quality makes both, the asset prices at which investors can sell their
assets and the loan-to-value (i.e. leverage) ratio at which they can borrow to be
endogenously determined. The simultaneity in the determination of asset prices and
leverage lead to the existence of liquidity spirals. For instance, a negative exogenous
shock that reduces leverage creates a fall in the funds available to finance capital
purchases (i.e. a decline in demand). It also increases the supply for assets in the
market, since entrepreneurs require selling more units to finance the same amount
of investment. These two effects create unambiguously a fall in prices. The fall
in prices reinforces the initial fall in loan-to-values since lenders expect the quality
of units used as collateral to be lower. This mechanism explains why alternative
sources of liquidity fall rapidly during downturns, and why liquidity can recover
faster during upturns.
Chapter 3. This paper, which is joint work with Eduardo Cavallo and Alejandro
Izquierdo, explores the determinants behind the decision of domestic investor to
adjust their asset position in response to a variation in gross capital inflows and avoid
episodes of net sudden stops. We present evidence that while sudden stops in gross
inflows are associated with global conditions, domestic factors such as the degree
of domestic liability dollarization, economic growth and institutional background
are important to prevent these episodes in becoming net sudden stops. We also
extend the concept of “Prevented Sudden Stops” and differentiate “Delayed” from
“Purely Prevented” episodes. A purely prevented episode is one in which there is
not a sudden stop in any of the quarters for which there was a sudden stop in gross
inflows. A delayed episode is one in which there is at least one quarter in which
there was both a sudden stop in gross inflows and a net sudden stop. We want
to analyze how this classification can affect the extent to which economic growth
and domestic liability dollarization can still account for the offsetting behavior of
domestic investors.
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Chapter 1: Financial Shocks and Investment Recovery in a Model of
Customer Markets
1 Introduction
The aftermath of the Great Recession has challenged our understanding of how real
investment and financial frictions interact. Existing models of physical investment
and impaired access to credit motivated by the 2007-2009 crisis exhibit a tight
association between investment and financial conditions. This association allowed
these models to characterize the dynamics of real and financial variables observed
during the downturn. However, their prediction of a robust recovery fueled by
improving financial conditions is at odds with the dynamics displayed by investment
throughout the recovery period. In particular, the sharp improvement in financial
conditions was accompanied by a sluggish recovery in aggregate investment.
The years that followed the Great Recession witnessed a change in the co-
movement between investment and financial conditions. As shown in Figure 1.1,
nonresidential private fixed investment remained depressed, and gradually reached
pre-crisis levels in 2012. Also, economic activity depicted in the blue dashed line
and represented by manufacturing output experienced a slow recovery process. In
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contrast, the index of credit standards reported by the Federal Reserve Board re-
veals a drastic tightening in credit conditions by banks during the crisis, but a rapid
loosening that had reached pre-crisis credit standards by 2009. Aggregate measures
of financial soundness (e.g., the Chicago Financial Index) are also indicative of a
prompt recovery of financial conditions during the same period.
Analysis of the correlations between financial variables and real investment
provides additional evidence of the changing dynamics after the Great Recession.
Table 1.1 shows how the strong correlation observed prior to the crisis between the
cyclical component of private nonresidential fixed investment, credit spreads (taken
from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)) and year-to-year growth in the S&P500 fell
after 2009. The correlation between credit spreads and private fixed investment
shifted from −0.68 prior to the crisis to 0.09 after the crisis; at the same time, the
correlation between the same category of investment and asset prices dropped from
0.93 to 0.32.
If the financial turmoil that hit the world in 2007 made it clear that finan-
cial conditions play an important role in shaping macroeconomic outcomes and
dynamics, why did investment not fit this pattern in the recovery period? Why did
investment fail to react to improving financial conditions?
In this chapter I posit that a firm’s reaction to deteriorating financial condi-
tions has consequences for its customer base. These consequences are key to under-
standing investment decisions after financial conditions have stabilized.1 I present a
1 This argument is in line with the views of Krishnamurthy and Muir (2015), who argue that
as credit spreads revert to pre-crisis levels more quickly, there is a separate role for financial and
real factors in explaining the evolution of macroeconomic variables in the aftermath of a financial
crisis. This suggests, according to the authors, that the state variables that drive investment are
2
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dates.
search and matching model of customer capital in which firms must engage in selling
effort. Following a negative financial shock, the firm reacts by cutting expenses in
sales-related activities for customer attraction and increasing prices to regain inter-
nal liquidity. However, these decisions are not costless; in a model that encompasses
the long-lasting nature of customer relationships, they are taken at the expense of
future customer accumulation. Once financial conditions start to improve, the firm
postpones physical investment decisions due to a shortage of customers relative to
existing production capacity and the need to first rebuild its customer base.
This chapter introduces a new transmission mechanism that stems from finan-
cial shocks. When coping with a reduction in external financing, firms adjust not
different from those that drive financial conditions.
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Tab. 1.1: Correlations between the cyclical components of Real and Financial Variables
corr (INV, SP500) corr (INV,GZSPRD) corr (SP500, GZSPRD)
Pre-crisis 0.636 -0.320 -0.552
Crisis 0.931 -0.676 -0.888
Post-crisis 0.324 0.094 -0.882
Source Author’s own calculations based on data from FRED. “Pre-crisis” corresponds to the period 2005q2-
2007q3, “Crisis” to the period 2007q4-2009q2, and “Post-crisis” to the period 2009q3-2011q4.
only their pricing decisions but also their selling effort, in a way that saves money
in the short-run but reduces future demand. Thus, the introduction of customer
markets helps us to better understand the drivers of investment decisions during
and after a financial crisis and to better target economic policies to boost economic
activity.
Selling Effort and Financial Conditions. The main trigger mechanism pre-
sented in the model is the decline in expenses for customer accumulation that fol-
lows a financial shock. This idea is supported empirically in the procyclicality of
selling effort and its positive comovement with financial conditions. In fact, differ-
ent measures of selling effort underwent a steep decline during the Great Recession.
An important fraction of this selling effort is accounted for by employment in sales-
related activities. In fact, CPS data show that employment in sales and related
occupations plunged 5.8% from peak to trough during the Great Recession. In ad-
dition, the decline in sales employment growth during the 2007 recession was steeper
than the decline in total employment growth, as pointed out by Gourio and Rudanko
(2014a).
Sales-related employment is characterized by its procyclicality and contem-
poraneous comovement with financial conditions. Table 1.2 reports the results of
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simple linear regressions between the year-to-year growth in alternative definitions
of sales-related activities and measures of economic activity and financial conditions.
The definition of sales-related activities is based on the categories for sales employ-
ment described in Gourio and Rudanko (2014a). The first category corresponds to
the broad definition of Sales and Related Occupations reported in the 2010 Census
Occupation Classification. The second category excludes cashiers and clerks from
the first category. The third category consists of the second category plus mar-
ket researchers, managers in marketing, and purchasing agents. Finally, the fourth
category excludes first-line supervisors from the third category.2
Column (1) in Table 1.2 presents evidence of a positive comovement between
the growth in sales-related activities and the growth in total employment for the
period 1994q1-2015q4. This is suggestive of the procyclicality in sales employment
activities. The results reported in column (1) are also indicative of the higher
responsiveness of sales employment to fluctuations in economic activity compared
to total employment. This implies that sales employment exhibits more cyclical
variation, and that it is a volatile component of total employment.
Moreover, periods of financial distress coupled with a reduction in credit
growth and a higher level of bond spreads are associated with periods of contrac-
tion in selling effort. Column (2) highlights positive and significant comovement
between the year-to-year growth in total credit to non financial corporations and
2 This classification accounts for the fact that the definition of sales-related activities includes
categories of employment more closely related to customer attention, such as cashiers and clerks,
rather than new customer acquisition. And that the current Census classification of sales activities
excludes occupations that can play an active role in customer accumulation, such as marketing
researchers. A detailed description of the sales-related occupations groups is presented in Appendix
1.B.
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the growth in sales employment for the period 1994q1-2015q4. This correlation is
higher for categories with more involvement in customer acquisition (third or fourth
categories). This positive comovement is not driven by the Great Recession, but
rather as column (3) shows excluding this particular period does not eliminate this
relationship. However, for some categories of sales employment, the comovement
has strengthened during recent years.
The comovement between financial conditions and selling effort is not limited
exclusively to credit growth. Column (4) reports a negative and significant correla-
tion between the measure of credit spreads obtained from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012) and the growth in sales-related employment.
An additional category of selling effort includes expenditures on advertising,
which accounts for 2-3% of total GDP in the U.S. These expenditures are procyclical
and volatile, as pointed out by Hall (2012), based on the McCann advertising series.
For example, during the first quarter of 2009, total advertising in the U.S. fell
approximately 12% compared with the same quarter in 2008.3
Pricing Decisions. The decline in customer investment following a financial
shock in my model is coupled with an increase in prices and markups. After a nega-
tive shock, firms increase prices (i.e., reduce discounts) as an optimal response to the
decline in sales-related expenses and to increase their internal liquidity. In the pres-
ence of search and matching frictions in customer attraction, when a firm is forced
to cut expenses for sales employment, it is no longer optimal to offer discounts. This
3 “For many businesses that carry ads the pain is even greater still. Advertisement in magazines
is expected to fall by 18.3%. Radio advertisement is predicted to plunge by 21.8% and newspaper
advertisement by 26.5%.” (The Economist, “Nothing to shout about”, July 2009.)
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is because lower levels of sales employment reduce the probability of creating new
customer relationships. With low probabilities of matching, a price reduction only
results in lower current profitability and longer queues for potential new customers
and not in creating more customer relationships. This mechanism is reinforced in
my model by the higher value that current profitability has in periods when external
sources of financing are lacking, which also discourages lowering prices.
This feature in price-setting behavior is not novel. Since Phelps and Winter
(1970), the idea that firms seek to maintain and retain customers through pricing
decisions has been present in the literature, and has been extended to analyze periods
of financial turmoil. Greenwald et al. (1984), Gottfries (1991), Klemperer (1995),
and Dasgupta and Titman (1998) argue that during a recession and in the presence
of credit market imperfections, firms boost current profits to meet liabilities by
increasing prices, at the expense of forgoing market share. Opler and Titman (1994)
and Chevalier (1995) provide empirical evidence that more financially constrained
firms lose market share during economic downturns and have higher prices than
their less leveraged rivals.4
More recently, Gilchrist et al. (2014a) and Gilchrist et al. (2016) find evidence
that during the last recession, firms experiencing a deterioration in their balance
sheets were more likely to increase prices to cope with liquidity shortfalls. In par-
ticular, they find that average prices at liquidity-constrained firms jumped almost
4 These ideas are also echoed in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), who find that during reces-
sions, financially constrained supermarket chains raise prices relative to less financially constrained
chains. Pichler et al. (2008) posit that more indebted firms use higher effective discount rates when
valuing investment returns and, as a consequence, are less willing to lower their current prices to
invest in market share. Campello (2003) finds that markups are more countercyclical in industries
in which firms use more external financing.
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Tab. 1.2: Sales Employment and Financial Conditions
∆Sit = αi + βiXt + ǫit
∆Employ. ∆Credit. Spreads
1994q1− 2015q4 1994q1− 2015q4 1989q1− 2007q2 1994q1− 2012q3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Sales-Related Occupations (SRO)
1.025 0.267 0.177 -1.371
(0.076) (0.044) (0.076) (0.309)
2. SRO − cashiers and clerks
1.220 0.358 0.274 -1.262
(0.107) (0.054) (0.003) (0.410)
3. SRO − cashiers and clerks + marketing
1.238 0.351 0.283 -1.361
(0.106) (0.053) (0.099) (0.402)
4. SRO − supervisors, cashiers and clerks + marketing
1.195 0.358 0.468 -1.561
(0.138) (0.063) (0.105) (0.449)
Notes: Total employment and series of sales-related occupations are from CPS monthly files obtained from IPUMS. All series are seasonally adjusted using Tramo-
Seats. All coefficients in the table are significant at 1%. Credit corresponds to growth of total credit to nonfinancial institutions, adjusted for breaks. Series for spreads
are obtained from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012).
30% relative to liquidity-unconstrained firms.
A Complementary Demand Channel. As a result of the reduction in selling ef-
fort and increase in prices, the firm finds itself with fewer customers. The mechanism
highlighted in this chapter introduces a new demand channel. Previous research on
demand factors in the Great Recession have emphasized household wealth and sav-
ings following the empirical work of Mian and Sufi (2010, 2012). Using county-level
data, the authors show how households’ deleveraging process and the subsequent
contraction in demand are important in understanding aggregate economic perfor-
mance.5 This mechanism has been quantitatively assessed by Caggese and Orive
(2015), Huo and Rios-Rull (2012); Rios-Rull and Huo (2016). The demand channel
presented in these articles relies on households’ attempt to increase savings, which
results in a contraction in demand and a subsequent lowering of prices and occupa-
tion rates. This brings about lower employment and investment, which reinforces
5 Similarly, using micro data, Kahle and Stulz (2013) find evidence of a demand channel that
affects capital expenditures for firms in the U.S with different credit reliance. For the case of the
Eurozone, Barkbu et al. (2015) report that little of the observed declined in investment remains
unexplained after accounting for the effect of the decline in output.
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the household’s initial desire to increase savings and reduce consumption, which
triggers in the process, a sizeable recession.
Two important distinctions separate this chapter from this literature. First,
the behavior of demand in my model is fully determined by the firm’s choices in
terms of selling effort and price-setting; if anything, the deleveraging story and the
mechanism I propose can be thought of as complementary and provide an addi-
tional source of amplification, as discussed more extensively in section 5.2. Second,
financial shocks in this chapter are not accompanied by a deflationary process, as in
Rios-Rull and Huo (2016); on the contrary, in my model firms lower the discounts
charged to new customers and increase markups after being hit by a shock.
Investment Recovery and Financial Shocks. In summary, when firms need to
invest in customer accumulation, financial shocks affect the dynamics of investment
during and after the shock. During the shock investment expenditures fall as a
consequence of the reduction in external sources of funding and the lower value the
firm puts into the future. This is also true after the shock, because the shortage
of customers relative to its installed capacity limits the profitability of undertaking
investment projects. With fewer customers, one unit of capital invested does not
necessarily increase marginal revenue in the next period.
As a result, after financial conditions have started to improve, it is therefore
not optimal to expand capacity until this base has also begun to recover. This
simple mechanism can account, first, for a weak recovery in investment despite a
rapid improvement in financial conditions. And second, the mechanism accounts
for the positive correlation exhibited between financial conditions and investment
9
during downturns, as well as, the lower or even negative correlation during upturns.
Additional Related Literature. This chapter is closely related to Ottonello
(2015); both documents focus on the slow recovery of investment after a recession.
However, the direct mechanisms through which financial conditions affect invest-
ment differ. In Ottonello’s model, financial shocks cause capital unemployment.
Consequently, after a shock, the economy devotes more resources to absorbing ex-
isting capital than accumulating new capital. In my model, in contrast, financial
shocks cause a reduction in the customer base, which confines investment during the
recovery phase. When financial conditions begin to improve, firms need to devote
more resources to rebuilding their customer base than to accumulating capital.
This chapter builds extensively on the idea of customer markets presented by
Gourio and Rudanko (2014b). These authors argue that goods market frictions
result in relationships that are long-term in nature, which renders the customer
base an important variable in understanding firms’ decision making. Models that
include customer capital are able to capture investment dynamics that go beyond
the predictions of the standard Tobin q′s model, since they introduce an additional
adjustment cost on firm expansion. I extend this framework to analyze how these
frictions also interact with financial conditions to explain investment dynamics dur-
ing the recovery period after the Great Recession. In this respect, this chapter is
also related to Gilchrist et al. (2016), who introduce financial frictions in a model of
customer markets to explain the lack of deflation experienced during the 2007-2009
period.
A competing literature has evaluated the role of uncertainty in explaining the
10
weak recovery, with mixed results. On the one hand, Bloom et al. (2012) argue that
uncertainty shocks have sizeable effects on GDP and can also account for the weak
recovery in real variables. On the other hand, Arellano et al. (2012) introduce a
model with financial frictions and point out that uncertainty shocks cannot account
for the slow recovery after the Great Recession. Their results differ mostly because
of different assumptions on the persistence of uncertainty episodes, rather than on
the existence or absence of financial frictions. While in Bloom et al., periods of
heightened uncertainty are estimated to be highly persistent, Arellano et al. find
low persistence in their measure of uncertainty (the interquartile range of sales
growth across firms), which falls relatively quickly after 2009.6
Along the same lines, Fajgelbaum et al. (2014) show how a high level of un-
certainty about economic fundamentals deters investment when uncertainty evolves
endogenously. The authors conclude that the economy can potentially experience a
unique rational expectations equilibrium in which low activity and high uncertainty
are self-reinforced.
This chapter is also related to Rognlie et al. (2014), who associate the slow
recovery in nonresidential investment with a combination of investment overhang in
the residential sector and weak aggregate demand. According to the authors, excess
housing capital lowered residential investment, since a high stock of housing worked
as a substitute for new investment. Additionally, the zero lower bound on interest
6 The behavior of uncertainty during the recovery has been different depending on the mea-
sure considered. While the Policy Uncertainty Index developed by Baker et al. (2015) has dis-
played great persistence, other measures (realized stock market volatility, idiosyncratic stock mar-
ket volatility, option-implied volatility on the S&P 100 stock futures index, forecast dispersion, and
measure of economic data surprises) recovered rapidly after the crisis. See Caldara et al. (2014)
for a comparison.
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rates prevented other sectors from offseting the fall in residential investment. In
such way, the overall fall in aggregate demand reduced the returns on capital and,
as a consequence, nonresidential investment.
Although not directly related, this chapter builds on Jovanovic (2009), who
postulates that capital investment requires not only resources (e.g., consumption
units or cash) but also an investment option (i.e., a project). Project availability
can be rationalized in my model as an opportunity to expand provided by growth in
the customer base. This is because the presence of customer markets introduces a
wedge between the expected return of a unit of capital tomorrow and Tobin’s q; this
wedge can be understood as a measure of the availability of profitable investment
projects, and it is mainly driven by the state of customer capital. In this way, the
return of investment after a collapse in the customer base can be understood as a
reduction in project availability that limits investment decisions.7
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes investment
recovery for different groups of firms. Section 3 introduces a model of investment
with financial frictions and customer markets. Section 4 discusses the model’s impli-
cations for investment and pricing decisions. Section 5 presents quantitative results,
and Section 6 concludes.
7 Banerjee et al. (2015) state that the slow growth in capital formation is due to a lack of prof-
itable investment opportunities. However, their argument is based on the premise that uncertainty
about future demand prevents firms from committing to irreversible physical investment.
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2 Investment in the Aftermath of the Great Recession
The aftermath of the Great Recession has been characterized by a generalized slow
recovery in capital expenditures. This section reports how after two years of recovery
and despite of better financial conditions, average investment rates were below pre-
crisis level. In addition, in this section I assess using matching estimators, whether
the extent of recovery differs across firms with different degrees of financial reliance,
and whether this reliance also has implications for the behavior of investment dy-
namics during the downturn. I find evidence that firms with low levels of cash and
short-term positions experienced a more pronounced decline in investment during
the crisis, followed by a relatively weaker recovery, compared to firms with similar
characteristics. This result complements the findings of Gilchrist et al. (2014b) that
this group of firms was also more prone to increase prices during the Great Recession
in order to regain internal liquidity at the expense of customer acquisition.
For this purpose, I collect quarterly data from CRSP/Compustat from the
third quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 2013. I classify firms based on infor-
mation from 2006q2 about their leverage ratios, bank/credit dependance, collateral
availability, and their liquidity position, to account for different levels of financial
reliance. These categories are obtained by combining data from Compustat and
the information contained in Dealscan and CapitalIQ. All variable definitions and
groups’ construction are described in more detail in Appendix 1.B.
The sample of firms is divided into six interrelated categories. The first cate-
gory corresponds to firms with bank relationships. This bank-related group encom-
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passes firms with two or more loan facilities with the same U.S lead bank in the five
years before the crisis, according to Dealscan. Firms are also classified in terms of
their leverage ratios. Firms with high leverage includes firms in the first quintile
of leverage distribution. This group of firms is particularly relevant, as Giroud and
Mueller (2016) finds evidence that more highly leveraged firms exhibit a significantly
larger decline in employment in response to a drop in consumer demand during the
Great Recession.
From this group of highly leveraged firms, I distinguish some additional cate-
gories. First, I examine firms with a bank loan or revolver at the end of 2006; this
category is introduced as an alternative measure for bank-related firms to overcome
the fact that information in Dealscan is limited to larger firms. Second, I distin-
guish firms with high leverage and real estate proprietorship; this group captures the
relevance of the collateral channel as an important driver in investment decisions.
This channel was extensively discussed by Chaney et al. (2012), and it is stressed
by macro models that link impaired access to credit and investment. This group
of firms can potentially benefit not only by improvements in financial conditions,
but also by the upturn in commercial real estate prices. Third, I distinguish firms
with low levels of cash stocks: some highly leveraged firms have access to short-
term liquidity positions that reduce their vulnerability to abrupt shifts in financial
conditions.
Finally, firms are classified according to their liquidity ratio, the sum of cash
and short-term investment over assets. This ratio is a measure of the ability to turn
short-term assets into cash to cover debt obligations and fund operation costs. This
14
category corresponds to firms in the two lowest quintiles of the liquidity ratio by
2006q2. According to Gilchrist et al. (2016), firms with low liquidity ratios are more
prone to increase prices as an adjustment mechanism to cope with the reduction in
external sources of financing.
2.1 Investment: Descriptive Statistics
The weak recovery in investment in the aftermath of the Great Recession was gen-
eralized across firms with different ex-ante reliance on financial conditions. Table
1.3 shows quarterly averages of capital expenditures, during and after the Great
Recession. Column 1 corresponds to the values obtained for the whole sample. The
first empirical observation is that investment, measured as the ratio of capital ex-
penditures over lagged property, plant and equipment, fell sharply during the Great
Recession, from a pre-crisis average of 9.51 percent to an average of 5.42 percent in
the second year of the crisis, i.e., a decline of 43 %. In the first year following the
crisis, capital expenditure recovered by only 0.9 percentage points to an average of
6.37 percent in 2009q3 − 2010q2. The recovery in the second year is larger, reach-
ing an average of 8.40 %, though still below pre-crisis levels, as indicated by the
significance of the hypothesis test for differences in means. Since then, the average
capital expenditures ratio has oscillated around 8 %, which is still below the levels
observed before the Great Recession.
In the remaining columns I repeat the exercise for subsamples to describe the
evolution of investment on firms facing different financial conditions. Column 2






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the crisis. These firms display a lower pre-crisis capital expenditure than the whole
sample. In the crisis they experienced a fall in investment of the same order of
magnitude as the whole sample (35 percent). The recovery following the recession
has been slow, particularly in the first two years after the official end of the crisis.
The hypothesis test comparing the pre-crisis average in 2006q3−2007q2 against the
post-crisis average in 2010q3− 2011q2 indicates that their difference is statistically
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
Columns 3-6 contain the results corresponding to highly leveraged firms, i.e.
firms in the top quintile of the leverage distribution. While they experienced a fall in
investment of 47 percent during the crisis, similar to the whole sample, these firms
experienced a slightly faster recovery in their investment in the aftermath of the
Great Recession than the whole sample, though the differences are not meaningful.
Despite this, the recovery in investment was slow and had still not reached pre-crisis
levels as of 2012. The only exception are the high leveraged firms that are dependent
on bank loans. For these firms investment in the second year following the crisis was
not statistically different from pre-crisis levels. This result is explained by a higher
dispersion in this sub-sample, since the differences in the means are not different
from those observed for other sub-samples. Firms with high leverage and real estate
assets (Column 5) experienced a decline of 38% in capital expenditures, one of the
largest declines from pre-crisis to the second year in the recession in the sample.
For this group, after two years in recovery, capital expenditure still remained 25%
below the average in 2006q3− 2007q2.
Firms with high leverage and low levels of cash holdings (Column 6) do not
17
behave very differently from the whole sample. Although, this sub-sample display
substantially lower pre-crisis levels of capital-expenditures-to-property ratio (1.2 per-
cent), the hypothesis tests of the difference between the average in the year prior to
the crisis and the average in the first year after the official end of the crisis indicates
that the two magnitudes are not statistically different.
Finally, firms with low liquidity are characterized by average capital expendi-
ture ratios that are not statistically different from the mean of the whole sample. In
fact, investment for low liquidity firms is not statistically different from investment
of firms with higher leverage. However their investment rate fell by 37% during the
crisis and was still 7% below pre-crisis levels two years into the recovery.
In summary, after two years of recovery and despite of better financial condi-
tions, average investment rates across different samples were below pre-crisis level.
The slow recovery in investment in the aftermath of the Great Recession was gen-
eralized across firms with different ex-ante reliance on financial conditions.
2.2 Matching Estimators
To assess the effect on investment of reliance on external financing during the recov-
ery period, I employ the Abadie and Imbens’s matching estimator and compare the
average change of capital expenditures between the final year of the crisis (2008q3-
2009q2) and the first year of the recovery (2009q3-2010q2) for matched firms within
the groups described above. For two reasons I chose these periods. First, it allows
me to control for seasonality, because I compare equivalent periods in different years.
And second, it reduces the likelihood of a change in the financing composition of
18
firms, which can render the initial classification less reliable.
To construct this estimator, I first consider firms that display more reliance
on financial conditions (treated observations). Then, from the remaining firms in
the population (non-treated observations), I select control observations that best
match the treated ones on several dimensions. The covariates considered to perform
the matching are industry, credit rating, size, cash flows, market-to-book value, and
when the initial classification does not include them, leverage and cash stocks, as in
Almeida et al. (2012) and Kahle and Stulz (2013).
Matches in categorical variables such as industry and credit ratings are exact.
Exact matching by industry allows me to control for the different size and role of
customer markets in different sectors of the economy, a feature highlighted by Gourio
and Rudanko (2014b). Matches in continuous variables (e.g., leverage, size, cash,
cash flows, and market-to-book ratio) are not exact. Thus, the results reported
include a bias correction to account for inexact matches. I select one match per firm
and exclude from the estimation all firms with no close exact match. Matches are
created based on the averages of the covariates as of 2006.
Table 1.4 reports the average treatment effect on the treated group for changes
in capital expenditures. In the first column, I show results for firms with a bank rela-
tionship; for this group, there is no differential pattern in the recovery of investment
relative to the otherwise equivalent firms in the control group.
Column (2) reports the estimates for firms with high leverage. The evidence
indicates that these firms had a faster recovery than their matches in the control



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by the crisis in terms of capital expenditures, as shown in Panel B of Table 1.4.
Therefore, there would be no reason to expect that their capital expenditures would
recover at a slower pace. These results are in line with Kahle and Stulz (2013).
Within the highly leveraged firms, I consider three subgroups: those with bank
dependence, those that own real estate, and those with a low stock of cash. Results
for these groups are displayed in Columns (3)-(5). There is no evidence of a faster
decline or recovery of investment for these firms relative to their respective control
groups.
Finally, firms with low liquidity levels show a weaker recovery in their capital
expenditures relative to the control group. Notice that this group of firms exhibit
similar investment rates compared to highly leveraged firms, so the magnitude of
this variation is relevant for total investment as discussed in previous section. When
I extend the analysis to compare the drop in capital expenditures entailed by the
crisis, firms in this category exhibit a significant larger contraction. In summary,
capital expenditures from firms with low liquidity levels were relatively more affected
by the Great Recession; the recovery is also weaker compared to similar firms, but
with higher levels of cash and short-term investment.
This result is important, since Gilchrist et al. (2014b) present additional ev-
idence on the behavior of this group of firms during the Great Recession. More
specifically, these firms were more likely to increase prices to cope with the reduc-
tion in external financing. But more importantly, if only financial constraint were at
play, we expected firms with low liquidity to recover faster than their counterparts.
These dynamics of lower investment, higher prices, and weaker recoveries are con-
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sistent with the predictions of models with customer markets and financial frictions,
which I introduce in the next section.
3 Model
This chapter builds on the industry model of Gourio and Rudanko (2014b), with
its framework extended to introduce financial frictions in line with Jermann and
Quadrini (2012). Industry production is carried out by a large representative firm
that operates in j different submarkets within the same industry. This model em-
bodies the idea that expenses on sales representatives and discounts to attract po-
tential buyers are necessary inputs to create new customer relationships. This simple
framework provides analytical tractability and allows me to delineate the mecha-
nisms through which financial shocks impact investment decisions when customer
relationships are important.
The model builds on the competitive search framework introduced by Moen
(1997), in which firms attract new customers by granting discounts to balance the
trade-off between attracting more customers and increasing profitability per cus-
tomer; customers balance the trade-off between lower discounts and congestion when
searching for products. This form of price-setting has serious consequences for fi-
nancially constrained firms, as it exacerbates the trade-off between higher current
profitability and customer base during periods of distress.
22
3.1 Firm
Consider an economy in which one large firm produces a continuum of goods in
the interval [0, 1] and sells them in different submarkets, denoted by j. The firm’s
objective is to maximize the present discounted value of dividends, subject to a flow-
of-funds constraint and a borrowing constraint. The firm discounts the future at a
rate β. The economy is characterized by competitive search, so the firm posts prices
to attract new clients within each submarket. As in Arseneau and Chugh (2008),
the focus of this chapter is the symmetric equilibrium in which the firm chooses the
same allocations for each submarket j. Thus I dispense with the use of subindex j.
Production. This firm produces yst units of output using a production tech-
nology of the form f(lt, kt, ut, zt) = ztl
α
t (utkt)
1−α where 0 < α ≤ 1. Production
makes use of a flexible factor of production (lt) with a fixed cost that equal to 1,
and capital services, which comprise the product of installed capital (kt) and the
utilization rate (ut). Production is also subject to an aggregate productivity shock
z that is governed by an AR(1) process.
Capital Accumulation. Capital accumulation involves a time-to-build tech-
nology, with an endogenous rate of depreciation that depends on the degree of
utilization. Investment is subject to a physical adjustment cost. In this way, if the
firm decides to adjust its capital stock (xt > 0), the total cost of investment would
include the purchase price and the physical adjustment cost denoted by Φ(xt, kt).
23
The capital stock evolves according to:
kt+1 = (1− δ
k(ut))kt + xt (1.1)
where xt denotes investment and δ
k(·) is a convex and increasing function that
determines the depreciation rate based on the level of capital utilization; capital
that is used more intensively depreciates faster.
Customer Markets. The firm ends period t− 1 with a stock nt−1 of customers
in each submarket. However, only a fraction 1−ρn survives as a customer in period
t. Except for this exogenous separation, customer relationships continue as long as
the customer is willing to purchase one unit of product, and as long as the firm is
willing to sell the unit.
I assume that each customer demands exactly one unit of the good sold in
each particular submarket. Therefore, the demand for goods in each submarket is
given by ydt = nt.
To attract new potential customers, the firm is prompted to hire sales represen-
tatives st (more broadly, this concept embodies advertising or product positioning).
As in Gourio and Rudanko (2014b), I assume that these sales representatives are
placed in different locations, starting from the most central to the least central.
Therefore, the measure of sales representatives generating st effective units of sales
is given by an increasing and convex function of the form κ(st).
Meetings between sales representatives and potential buyers are subject to
search frictions. In each period, some locations for submarket j might have more
24
sales representatives than buyers, or viceversa. Similar to the literature of frictional





measurem(ct, st) indicates the number of new customer relationships created when c
buyers and s sales representatives meet. The parameter ξ > 0 represents the degree
of matching efficiency, and γ ∈ (0, 1) the elasticity of new customer relationships
with respect to the number of sales representatives. Denote by θ = c
s
the queue
length of potential buyers over sales representatives. Then, the probability that a
sales representative finds a successful match is η(θ) = ξθγ, while the probability
that a potential buyer finds a successful match is µ(θ) = ξθγ−1.
I use the previous definitions to obtain an expression for the law of motion
of the stock of customers, which ultimately represents how the demand for goods
evolves over time:
nt = (1− ρ
n)nt−1 + stη(θt). (1.2)
Pricing Decisions. Buyers value differentiated product j at p, which is endoge-
nously determined by total industry output and independent of the specificity of the
product in each submarket. To maximize profits, the firm will charge the highest
possible price without driving the customer away. It is assumed, for simplicity, that
firms cannot commit to future prices, and thus optimally prices each unit at exactly
p in submarket j to extract the maximum amount of rent.
However, to attract new customers, firms can influence buyers’ decisions by
granting a discount εt in the first period of the customer relationship. How this
discount influences buyers’ decisions is described in Section 3.2. Total operating
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revenues are given by πt = pyt − stη (θt) εt. These revenues correspond to the value
of production net of the discount granted to new customers.
Financing Decisions. Firms use a combination of internal and external funds
to finance their total capital expenditures Φ (xt, kt), total cost of sales representatives
κ (st), total wage payments l, dividend payments ϕ (dt), and outstanding debt stock
bt. The firm’s dividend payout ϕ (dt) embeds not only dividend distribution, but
also a cost of deviating from the optimal target; these costs are given by a convex
function that penalizes deviations from the steady-state level of dividends. The
aggregate flow-of-funds constraint for the firm is defined as:
πt − l − Φ (xt, kt)− κ (st)− ϕ (dt) +
bt+1
R
− bt = 0. (1.3)
Debt bt is risk free and R = (1+r(1−τ)) includes a tax benefit of debt. Firms
also raise funds with an intraperiod loan to finance working capital; a fraction ϕw
of the wage bill and sales-related expenses must be paid upfront, before production
and revenues are realized. This intra-period loan is repaid at the end of the period at
zero interest. The ability to borrow intra and intertemporally is bounded by limited
enforcement of debt contracts. Lenders require total liabilities to be limited by the








≤ ζtkt+1 + ψπt (1.4)
The variable ζt follows an AR(1) process around its unconditional mean ζ.
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This shock represents a reduced form for a financial shock in the sense of Jermann
and Quadrini (2012), as it limits the capacity to access external sources of financing.8
This simple constraint allows me to isolate the more direct effects of a reduction in
borrowing capacity in the presence of customer markets, as presented in section 5.2.
Constraint (1.4) is similar to the one presented by Hennessy and Whited
(2005), which requires the sum of cash flows plus the market limit on borrowing
to be at least as large as the amount of debt issued. This feature of the model
adds liquidity motives in price-setting decisions. By setting higher prices (i.e., lower
discounts), the firm is able to increase not only its internal liquidity, but also its
external funding to relax the flow-of-funds constraint. Nevertheless, it is important
to point out that the relationship between financial conditions and prices is not
limited to this class of models with collateral constraints. In particular, given the
structure of the model, the use of revenues in the borrowing constraint is not a
necessary condition for firms to lower discounts following a financial shock, as will
be discussed in the quantitative section of the chapter.
3.2 Buyers
There is a measure one of identical households, with a measure one of individuals who
live in each household. At each period of time there is a fraction ct (endogenously
determined) of members of the household searching for products in sub-market j
from which to buy goods. Due to informational frictions, in order to purchase what is
8 Duchin et al. (2010) argues that the 2007-2009 crisis was characterized by a negative shock to
the supply of external finance for nonfinancial firms. Bassett et al. (2014) present evidence that
the reduction in the ability to borrow by firms and households was due to the reduction in credit
supply lines.
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produced in each market, the potential buyer must meet with a sales representative
st hired by the firm to sell in that specific market.
Each period the household optimally chooses a combination of places to visit
based on the discounts offered by the firm, εt, and the queue length in that sub-
market, θt. Assume that the opportunity cost of buying is constant and equal to 1.
Optimally, the expected payoff for searching for a new product to buy must equal
its cost, as shown in equation (1.5):
µ(θt)εt = 1 (1.5)
With probability µ(θ), the potential buyer successfully meets a sales representative
to form a new customer relationship. In that case, she receives a payoff of εt during
the first period of the relationship. This amounts to the total payoff, since after the
first period the firm charges customers a price equal to their exact valuation of the
good, which leaves no surplus for buyers to extract from the match in the future.
4 Pricing and Investment Decisions
Denote the aggregate state vector as Γt = {zt, ζt} which comprises the aggregate
productivity and financial state. Consider the problem of a large firm that chooses
the scale of production yt, customer level nt, sales expenses st, capacity utilization
ut, flexible factor use lt, capital stock kt+1, investment xt, debt issuance bt+1, price
discounts εt, and tightness θt in order to maximize the discounted stream of fu-
ture dividends dt. Letting λ
i
t denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with each
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specific restriction in problem 1, the firm’s optimization problem is given by
Problem 1. (Firm) The firm solves:
V (kt, nt−1, bt,Γt) = max
{dt, yt, nt, st, ut, lt, kt+1,
xt, bt+1, εt, θt}
dt + βE V (kt+1, nt, bt+1,Γt+1) (1.6)
subject to
(λ1t ) πt − lt − Φ (xt, kt)− κ (st)− ϕ (dt) +
bt+1
R
− bt = 0 (1.7)
(λ2t ) yt = f (kt, lt, ut, zt) (1.8)
(λ3t ) yt = nt (1.9)
(λ4t ) nt = (1− ρ
n)nt−1 + η (θt) st (1.10)
(λ5t ) kt+1 = (1− δ (ut)) kt + xt (1.11)








− ψπt ≤ ζtkt+1 (1.13)
taking the exogenous processes for Γt as given. Equation (1.7) corresponds to the
flow-of-funds constraint faced by the firm. Equation (1.8) is the aggregate produc-
tion function of the economy; thus, the multiplier λ2t represents the shadow value
of producing one additional unit of output. Equation (1.9) defines aggregate de-
mand and states that production should be equal to the number of units sold to
customers; the multiplier λ3t is the shadow value of selling one additional unit of
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the good. Equation (1.10) depicts the law of motion for customer base accumula-
tion; the multiplier λ4t is the marginal value of attracting an additional customer.
Equation (1.11) corresponds to the capital accumulation equation, which is stan-
dard except that utilization ut affects the degree of depreciation of existing units of
capital. Equation (1.12) is a “participation” constraint, as described in Section 3.2,
that equates the benefits and costs for a customer to search for a good to purchase.
Finally, equation (1.13) is a constraint that limits the borrowing capacity of the
firm; the multiplier λ7t associated with this constraint corresponds to the shadow
value of relaxing the constraint, either by increasing profits or an exogenous change
in borrowing capacity ζt.
The model is closed by assuming a decreasing demand curve for industry
output of the form p = ȳ−
1
σ , where ȳ stands for total production in steady state.9
Details on the derivation of the optimality conditions of this model are provided
in Appendix 1.A. In what follows, I will present only the main results and their
economic intuition for three important variables in the model: investment, pricing,
and sales.
Investment. To ease notation, denote qt = λ
5
tϕ
′(dt) and υt ≡ λ
7
tϕ
′(dt). qt stands for
the shadow value of one additional unit of capital, and υt accounts for the overall
shadow value of a tightening in financial conditions. In fact, a tightening in the
capacity to access external sources of funding increases the value of υt, as the fall in
dividends is offset by the increase in the shadow value of the borrowing constraint
9 Similarly to Gourio and Rudanko (2014b), the value of σ only affects the scale of variables in
steady state. The results presented in the quantitative section are not affected by its magnitude.
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λ7t .
To understand how the interaction between customer markets and financial
frictions affects investment decisions, we can use the investment Euler equation












. This condition equates the shadow value of a unit of capital
today to the sum of four different effects: the new unit’s marginal contribution to
revenue (represented by the first term in the bracket), the depreciated shadow value
of capital next period (second term in the bracket), the contribution of the new
unit to the marginal decline of future capital installation costs (third term in the
bracket), and the liquidity value of one unit of capital, represented in the last term.
Although these elements are standard in investment equations, this Euler con-
dition has several noteworthy non-neoclassical features. First, the firm discounts
future cash flows using a stochastic discount factor Ξt+1|t that is implicitly deter-
mined by firms’ balance sheet conditions. Notice that after a financial shock, as
dividends drop in response, the future value of one unit of capital is discounted
more heavily. Second, the marginal value of capital as a source of liquidity to relax
the constraint (1.13). These features are characteristic of models of investment with
financial frictions, as stated by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999).
Third, the contribution of one unit of investment in terms of future revenue
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is limited by the size of the future customer base; we can see this by expressing the
marginal productivity of one unit of capital as fk = (1 − α)n/k, which is the ratio
between customer evolution driven by equation (1.10) and capital stock evolution
driven by equation (1.11). Fourth, the contribution of a new unit of capital in
terms of future revenue is discounted by a factor λ2t . As stated previously, λ
2
t is the
shadow value of producing one additional unit of output (or the marginal cost of
using factors with higher intensity). However, in models where customers are assets












Vn (kt+1, nt, bt+1,Γt+1)
]}
λ2t as presented in equation (1.15) includes the current marginal net profit
of having one additional customer, which corresponds to the first term in brackets.
This value integrates the marginal sales revenues and additional liquidity introduced
by this new customer, net of costs from her acquisition. It also includes the future
gains from this newly created relationship, represented in the expected future value
that a marginal long-term relationship entails for the firm, which corresponds to
the second term in brackets. Combining (1.14) and (1.15) we see that the shadow
value of a customer tomorrow affects optimal investment today, by affecting how
the future marginal product of capital is discounted.
Customers as Investment Shocks. Shocks to the ability to transform consump-
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tion into capital goods also introduce a wedge between the marginal productivity
of capital and investment. According to Cuba-Borda (2015), this type of shock
can quantitatively account for the slow recovery of investment in the aftermath of
the Great Recession. The Euler equation for investment in a model with customer
markets cannot be fully nested into a model with investment shocks, as the latter
introduces additional wedges into the value of capital next period and installation
costs. However, the qualitative dynamics of the mechanism presented in this chapter
to explain the slow recovery in investment can be understood as one driver of the
estimated shock presented by Cuba-Borda (2015) as a driving force for investment
behavior after 2009.
Sales Expenses. The firm decides to hire sales representatives up to the point at





(1 + ϕwυt) = (p− εt) (1 + ψυt)+ (1.16)
+ (1− ρn)βEt
{[





(1 + ϕwυt). Marginal costs consist of the resources spent on
sales representatives and the costs of adjusting production factors. More specifically,
the latter cost is captured by mct, which reflects the cost of increasing the use of
the flexible factor to accommodate changes in customer orders. In terms of benefits,
one additional customer increases current profits by the margin p − εt, while total
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external liquidity available to the firm increases by the factor ψυt when the firm is
financially constrained and υt > 0 . With probability (1 − δ
n), this new customer
remains at the firm tomorrow, yielding her continuation value Vn(t+ 1) during the
next period.
In this model, the working capital constraint increases the marginal cost of
hiring one additional sales representative or one additional unit of the flexible pro-
duction factor by (1 + ϕwυt). These costs are increasing in the size of the friction υt.
In other words, when the external sources of financing for customer accumulation
are restricted, the cost of attracting customers is also higher. This results in a dras-
tic reduction in sales expenses for customer accumulation after a financial shock.
The firm can initially lessen the effect of this credit contraction by over-reducing
use of the flexible factor. In that way, resources are freed to devote to customer
accumulation; however, this decision is at the expense of a more intensive use of
capital in production, as will be highlighted in Section (5.2).
Pricing Decisions. The firm sets discounts to balance the trade-off between at-
tracting more potential buyers per sales representative and the cost of reducing the
current profit of the firm. Equation (1.17) shows that firms sets its discount to the





Vn(kt, nt−1, bt,Γt) (1.17)
The matching elasticity in equation (1.17) accounts for the relative importance
of buyers in forming new matches. A higher value of γ implies that more potential
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buyers per sales representative are required to form a new customer relationship,
so discounts must be higher to attract them. The term Vn represents the forward-
looking value of an additional customer, as presented in equation (1.18). This value
corresponds to the net gain of a customer and the continuation value for the firm.
Vn(kt, nt−1, bt,Γt) = p(1 + ψυt)−mct + (1− ρ
n)βEt
{[
Vn (kt+1, nt, bt+1,Γt+1)
]}
(1.18)
Higher profits allow the firm to attain higher external liquidity, which makes
the trade-off between customers and profits more pronounced. When the firm is
more financially constrained, the weight on profitability increases by the factor ψυt.
When the borrowing constraint is not binding (i.e., λ7t = υt = 0), the value of
additional external liquidity is not relevant to the pricing decision. However, when
the constraint tightens (υt > 0), profitability becomes more important, and thus the
firm is willing to sacrifice customer accumulation by setting lower discounts.
Notice that by combining equations (1.16), (1.17), and (1.18), it is possible to
conclude that discounts (εt) are directly proportional to the level of sales employ-
ments κ(st). Intuitively, when the firm is constrained and reduces the level of sales
employment, the probability of a potential customer matching with a sales represen-
tative drops. This means that keeping prices higher to attract more customers will
only result in longer queues and lower profitability, and not in new matches created.
Thus, financial shocks that limit the number of sales employees are associated with
higher discounts and higher markups. This holds even in scenarios in which profits




Functional forms: All functional forms used in this chapter are standard in
the literature. The investment cost function, which includes the direct cost of








kt. Capital depreciation is represented by the functional form
δk(u) = δ0u
̺
it with δ0 > 0 and ̺ > 0. The cost of equity issuance is determined
by ϕ(dt) = dt + ϕd(dt − d
ss)2 with ϕd > 0 and d
ss equal to dividend in steady
state. Sales cost are represented by a quadratic function of the form κ(s) = κ0
2
s2
with κ0 > 0. Productivity shock follows a standard AR(1) process of the the form
log zt+1 = ρz log zt + σzǫzt+1 , where ǫzt+1 ∼ N(0, 1). The process for the financial
shock follows an AR(1) of the form log ζt+1 = (1− ρζ) log (ζ) + ρζ log ζt + σζǫζt+1 .
Parametrization: The frequency of the model is quarterly. Parameters can be
grouped in three sets. The first group is calibrated according to standard values
obtained from the literature, the second group is quantified directly from the steady
state equations, and the third group is used to match autocorrelations and volatility.
A summary of the parameters in the baseline model is presented in Table 1.5.
The discount factor β is set to an annualized value of 0.95, and capital de-
preciation in steady state δkss to an annualized value of 10%. The capital share in
production is 0.36. The capital utilization rate in steady state equals 0.8; this is
consistent with the historical average rate of utilization according to the Federal
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Reserve Board’s Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization series. Customer
turnover is set to an annualized rate of ρn = 0.14, as presented in Paciello et al.
(2015). This value is in line with the findings of Gourio and Rudanko (2014b), and
more conservative than Gilchrist et al. (2016), who suggest an annualized rate of
21%. The parameter linking depreciation to utilization is set to an annualized value
of ̺ = 1.4. This value can be directly pinned down from optimality conditions in
the steady-state. δ0 equals to 0.13, consistent with the rate of utilization and the
annualized rate of capital depreciation. The interest rate is set at an annualized
rate of 4%. The tax benefit from debt is set to 0.35, as in Jermann and Quadrini
(2012).
The elasticity between discount prices ε and new matches is given by 1+γ
1−γ
,
where γ is the elasticity parameter of the matching function. In Gourio and Rudanko
(2014b), γ is set to a value of 0.11, which yields a price elasticity of demand of
approximately 1.2. Moreira (2016) sets the price elasticity for a model with customer
markets equal to 1.6, based on the findings of Foster et al. (2016). I set the elasticity
equal to 1.5 so γ = 0.2, similar to Moreira (2016), based on the findings of Paciello
et al. (2015), who show that an increase in prices of 1% increases yearly turnover
by 7 percentage points. The matching productivity is set to ξ = 0.6.
I set the mean of the financial shock equal to ζ = 0.499, which implies a steady
state debt-to-output ratio of 3.36. To calibrate the volatility and autocorrelation of
the financial shock, I normalize the Chicago National Credit Condition index such
that its mean corresponds to ζ. Then, I use the series from 1973q1 to 2016q2 to
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estimate ρζ = 0.913 and σζ = 0.036.
10 The residual vector from this exercise is used
to compute the simulated path of investment to changes in financial conditions.
The parameters for the TFP process are set equals to ρz = 0.9 and σz = 0.02 to
match output volatility. The cost of equity issuance ϕd is set to 0.3, as in Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) and Gilchrist et al. (2014b). The capital adjustment cost φk is
set to match the quarterly persistence of the hp-filtered nonresidential private fixed
investment in chained dollars for the period 1999q1 to 2006q4, which is equal to 0.9.
5.2 Results
Financial shocks. The red solid line in Figure 1.2 represents the response to a
one standard deviation shock in financial conditions. The financial shock directly
reduces the firm’s external resources. Without any restriction on equity issuance,
the firm would be able to meet its financial needs by issuing equity. However, equity
injections are costly in the model, as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Thus, the
tightening in borrowing capacity limits the availability of funds to finance firms’
expenditures and increases the value of υt, as the drop in dividends is offset by an
increase in λ7t . A higher υt implies a higher value for liquidity, but also that hiring
sales representatives and labor is more costly due to the working capital constraint.
As a consequence, expenses in sales-related activities κ(s) drop. The comple-
mentarity between discounts and sales employment and the increase in the value of
liquidity cause discounts to fall and markups to increase on impact, as presented in
10 Similar results are obtained using alternative measures of credit tightening, such as the St.
Louis FED financial conditions index or the survey of tightening conditions produced by the Federal
Reserve Board, although, the index of tightening in credit conditions exhibits a higher standard
deviations compared to alternative measures.
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Tab. 1.5: Model Parameters
Structural Parameters Value Source/Target
Discount Factor β = 0.95 Standard DSGE models
Labor Share α = 1− 0.36 Standard DSGE models
Average Depreciation Rate δss = 0.1 Annualized Rate (NIPA)
Customer Turnover ρn = 0.14 Paciello et al. (2015)
Interest Rate r = 0.04 Annualized Rate
Tax Discount τ = 0.35 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
Sales Costs κ0 = 1 Normalization
Equity Issuance Cost ϕd = 0.3 Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
Matching Productivity ξ = 0.6 Standard Matching Literature
Matching Elasticity γ = 0.2 Discount Elasticity=1.5
Constant Depreciation Function δ0 = 0.13 Consistent with δss and uss
Rate of Depreciation ̺ = 1.4 Investment Euler Equation
Liquidity Coefficient ψ = 0.75 Taxable Income/Deadweight Loss
Working Capital φw = 1 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
Mean collateral coefficient ζ = 0.414 Debt/GDP=3.36
Investment Adjustment Cost φk = 38 AR(1) Investment
Productivity Process ρz = 0.9 Gilchrist et al. (2014b)
σ2z = 0.020 Match Output Volatility
Financial Process ρζ = 0.9135 Chicago FED Index
σ2ζ = 0.04 Chicago FED Index
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panel 5 of Figure 1.2. Markups are countercyclical in the model. The reduction in
sales activity and discounts limits the number of new customers, so that the firm is
not able to match the losses associated with turnover. With fewer customers, pro-
duction falls as shown in panel 2. This suggests that financial shocks create a drop
in economic activity based exclusively on how firms cope with changes in economic
conditions.
The lower demand is accommodated for by a reduction in the use of factors
of production, more specifically, firms reduce the use flexible factor, while capital
utilization experiences an initial spike, followed by a drop. Intuitively, the firm
reacts by over adjusting labor, as it is also subject to the working capital constraint.
After a financial shock, the firm finds it optimal to reduce labor to free up resources
for customer accumulation, and to accommodate any excess of demand with a more
intensive use of capital. Once financial conditions have begun to improve, the lower
demand is accommodated with a combination of lower labor and capital utilization
levels.
Panel 8 shows that the response of investment to financial conditions exhibits
an inverted hump shape. Investment falls on impact as a result of the contraction
in resources to finance investment expenditures. But also it falls due to a higher
discounting of the future gain of one extra unit of capital tomorrow. The firm
finds itself short of customers relative to installed capacity as reported in panel 7.
Investment falls less than the number of customers due to the quadratic adjustment
costs and lower depreciation compared to customer turnover. This is important



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This fact has two important consequences: First, as the financial shock re-
verts to normal, the firm devotes more resources to recovering its customer base.
The model exhibits a rapid recovery in expenses for sales employment. However,
search frictions in customer markets delay the process of fully regaining customers,
so production takes time to return to steady-state levels. Also, the firm postpones
investment decisions until it has accumulated new customers. When the firm is lim-
ited by the customer base, investing in one unit of capital today does not necessarily
translate into higher marginal revenue tomorrow, making investment less responsive
to changes in financial conditions during the recovery phase.
TFP vs. Financial Shocks. Even though both shocks can have similar impacts
on investment and production, they entail contrasting dynamics in the use of pro-
duction factors. A negative TFP shock limits the amount of internally generated
funds, bringing about a decline in investment and sales-related expenses. The fall in
investment results in a tightening of the borrowing constraint as available collateral
drops. This effect is similar to the one obtained from a negative financial shock.
However, a negative TFP shock also reduces production capacity. This decline in
capacity is larger than the reduction in customers, due to lower sales-related ex-
penses. Thus, the firm accommodates for a negative TFP shock by increasing labor
and the rate of capital utilization. In contrast, as stated previously, a financial shock
does not affect production capacity and the firm accommodates for this shock by
reducing production factors.
Dampening vs. Long-Lasting Effects. How does the inclusion of customer
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markets affect investment dynamics, compared to standard models with financial
frictions? To assess this question, I shut down customers in the baseline model, such
that financial conditions only affect production due to the existence of a working-
capital constraint on labor. The dotted green line in Figure 1.2 presents the impulse
response to a financial shock in a model with financial frictions but without customer
markets.11
Two important conclusions can be drawn by comparing these two models.
First, customer markets dampen the immediate effect on economic activity of fi-
nancial shocks. The initial responses of investment and production are larger in a
model without customer capital. This is because the customer base adds stickiness
in the responses, so it works like a cushion for different types of shocks, both real
and financial. In other words, the current customer base is a state variable, there
is a bound on how much production can fall after a negative shock. Without this
limit, output can plunge even more on impact.
Second, the effects of financial shocks are long-lasting compared to a model
without customer markets. One of the main predictions of standard models with
financial frictions is that economic activity is enhanced by the improvement in fi-
nancial conditions.12 The dotted green lines in panels 2 and 8 of Figure 1.2 depict
how investment and production rapidly revert to steady state levels in a model with
11 Models of customer capital exhibit lower absolute volatilities compared to RBC models. Thus,
the standard deviation of the financial shock is recalibrated in the model without customer markets
to deliver the same absolute volatility of output as the baseline model.
12 Financial frictions are introduced to existing models as a recurrent phenomenon, which is
particularly exacerbated during periods of distress. This specific way of modeling has important
implications, since, as pointed out by Hall (2011), it implies that “negative” financial shocks (i.e.,
improvement in financial conditions) have the ability to stimulate economic activity.
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Simulated Investment Path Great Recession
Notes. Responses are log deviations from the non stochastic steady state. The financial shock series is rescaled such
that the value of the index in 2006q4 is equal to zero. Blue shaded areas correspond to NBER recessions.
only financial frictions. In contrast, in a model with customer markets, financial
shocks entail long-lasting consequences in economic activity and investment.
Investment Recovery and Financial Shocks. The inverted hump shape dis-
played by investment in response to financial shocks has important implications for
the evolution of investment during and after periods of financial distress, such as the
Great Recession. It implies that investment plunges with a deterioration in financial
conditions, does not respond immediately to improvements in these conditions, and
only gradually returns to pre-crisis levels. To asses these points, I feed the model
with the actual estimated series of innovations from the Chicago Financial Index for
the period 2006q4 to 2011q4 and simulate the evolution of investment if financial
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Customer Markets No Customer Markets
(1) (2) (3)
2006q4-2008q4 0.5414 0.8340 0.9891
2009q1-2011q4 -0.6943 -0.7924 0.6075
Source Author’s own calculations based on data from FRED. ”Pre-crisis” corresponds to the period 2006q4-
2011q4.
conditions were dictated by the dynamics of this index.13
The results of this simulation are displayed in Figure 1.3. The dashed line
corresponds to the dynamics of ζt, based on innovations from the financial index
used as an input in the model. The solid line corresponds to the path of invest-
ment. The model preserves the tight relationship between financial conditions and
investment during the downturn. The fall in investment is directly linked to the fall
in financial conditions, as investment falls prior to 2007q4. However, the model is
able to separate the dynamics of financial and real variables during the recovery.
Investment only responds to the sudden improvement in financial conditions two
quarters later, and returns to steady-state levels only gradually. These results are
in deep contrast with the standard predictions of models that link impaired access
to credit and investment. Notice that in absence of customer capital the behavior
of investment simply mimics the behavior of the financial shock.
13 Notice that this sequence of shocks is not perfectly anticipated by the agents, as they forecast
the future value of financial conditions based on the autoregressive process in Section 5.1. Although
alternative measures of financial conditions, such as the St. Louis Financial Index or Domestic
Banks Tightening Standards reported by the Federal Reserve Board might differ quantitatively,
they all preserve the same qualitative dynamics as the Chicago Financial Index.
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The sluggish recovery in investment and the relationship between financial
and real conditions predicted by the model are consistent with data correlations
for the period considered in the simulation. Table 1.6 compares the correlation
between the cyclical component of real private fixed investment and the Chicago
Financial Index before and after the upturn in the latter. Before the improvement in
financial conditions observed in 2008q4, the correlation between financial conditions
and investment was 0.54 in the data. For the same period, the correlation obtained
from the model is 0.83.
After 2008q4, there is a shift in the relationship between financial and real
conditions. The data show that the correlation between the Chicago Financial
Index and the Real Private Fixed Investment turned negative and equal to −0.69.
This is consistent with the results presented in Table (1.1) and discussed previously.
A model with customer markets is able to capture weakening in the sensitivity of
investment to financial conditions; the correlation from the model is also negative
during the same period and equal to −0.79. In contrast, a model without customer
capital predicts a lower but still positive correlation during the same period, as
shown in Table 1.6 .
Liquidity Effects. One important assumption in the model is the ability of profits
to generate not only internal but also external liquidity. This allows me to intro-
duce a liquidity motive to price-setting decisions. However, this assumption is not
qualitatively relevant for the model. Figure (1.4) presents the impulse responses of
discounts (ǫt) and markups after being hit by a financial shock, for two different
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Fig. 1.4: Response of Discounts and Markups to Financial Shocks (Different Levels of ψ)





























Notes. The responses are in log deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. The left panel correspond to
changes in ǫt to changes in ψ. The right panel corresponds to changes in (py − sη(θ)ǫ)/y over the marginal cost of
l.
values of ψ = 0.75 and ψ = 0.
Complementarity between sales and discounts causes firms respond to financial
shocks by setting a higher prices for new customers, even in the absence of liquidity
motives. The ability to use internal funds as a way to increase external capacity, as in
Hennessy and Whited (2005), has implication for pricing decisions, but it is not the
main driver of the results presented in this model. The reduction in discounts and
the increase in markups are mainly accounted for by the reduction in sales-related
expenses.14
Demand Shocks. The demand mechanism stressed in this chapter relies on firms’
inability to capture new customers after a financial shock. Although I did not ex-
plicitly model the behavior of existing customers, it is possible that the deleveraging
14 This is evident by analyzing equation (1.51) in appendix 1.A.
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process pointed out in Mian and Sufi (2010) has exerted an additional and general-
ized effect on the customer base of more and less financially constrained firms. This
idea finds support in Nevo and Wong (2015), who document that during the Great
Recession households purchased more on sale and at discount stores. To evaluate
the possibility that a demand shock not driven by the firm’s decisions might create
persistent investment dynamics during a financial crisis, I introduce a shock in the
separation rate of customers. For simplicity, I set the persistence and volatility of
this demand shock equal to the persistence of a TFP shock.
Figure 1.5 presents the impulse response of a simultaneous negative financial
shock and a positive shock in the separation rate of existing customers. This combi-
nation produces a more pronounced decline in customers, and thus in production. It
also generates a more sizeable and protracted drop in investment, compared to the
scenario of a financial shock alone. This highlights the importance of the customer
base in the evolution of investment dynamics during and after a financial recession.
Notice that there is no differential impact on sales expenses after the shock. This
suggests that the firm is devoting all available resources to rebuilding the customer
base as an important element of the recovery process.
6 Final Remarks
Existing models with financial frictions have had difficulty capturing the observed
dissonance between improving financial conditions and a weak investment recovery.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































hit by a financial shock that limits their capacity to raise external funds, they react
by cutting sales-related expenses and increasing their prices to cope with the effects
of credit rationing.
However, these decisions are not costless, and involve, a disinvestment in cus-
tomers, that translates into lower demand. When the firm is short of customers
relative to installed capacity, investment does not respond immediately to improv-
ing financial conditions. The mechanism underlying my model embeds a positive
relationship between financial and real conditions during the downturn, but a more
nuanced (negative) response during the upturn. This feature is consistent with the
correlation exhibited by the Chicago Financial Index and nonresidential Private
Fixed Investment during the period 2006q4-2011q4.
The dynamics of investment in the Great Recession are not the only phe-
nomenon that can be explained by customer markets. Models aimed at explaining
the decline of entrepreneurship, the entry and exit of firms, or the slow recovery of
unemployment could also benefit from incorporating long-lasting customer relation-
ships.
Although customer relationships help us to understand the slow recovery in
investment in response to improving financial conditions, this model needs to be
extended to capture the quantitative connotations of the Great Recession. One
approach would be explicit modeling of the household’s decisions on consumption,
labor supply, and savings. The combination of financial shocks at the firm and
household level reinforces the decline in demand through households’ deleveraging




In this section, I derive the optimality conditions of the model presented in Section
3. In constructing the equilibrium, I will restrict attention to an equilibrium that is
symmetric across submarkets. Therefore, for ease of notation, I will dispense with
the subscript j.
The firm’s choices are {dt, yt, nj , st, ut, kt+1, xt, bt+1, εt, θt} to maximize the dis-
counted stream of dividends. The firm’s optimization problem is
V (kt, nt−1, bt,Γt) = max
{dt, yt, nt, st, ut, kt+1,
xt, bt+1, εt, θt}
dt + βE V (kt+1, nt, bt+1,Γt+1)
(1.19)
s.t
(λ1t ) : πt − lt − Φ (xt, kt)− κ (st)− ϕ (dt) +
bt+1
R
− bt = 0 (1.20)
(λ2t ) : yt = f (kt, lt, ut, zt) (1.21)
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(λ3t ) : yt = nt (1.22)
(λ4t ) : nt = (1− ρ
n)nt−1 + η (θt) st (1.23)
(λ5t ) : kt+1 = (1− δ (ut)) kt + xt (1.24)








≤ ζtkt+1 + ψπt (1.26)
taking the exogenous processes for zt and ξt as given.
It should be noted that, in line with the competitive search literature, the
firm’s decision also involves posting discounts εt and choosing queue length θt in each
submarket. This requires incorporating, as an additional constraint to the problem,
the participation constraint from the household’s problem of equation (1.5) in the
main text.
First-order conditions of the above problem with respect to each of the choice
variables are presented below.
dt : 1− λ
1
tϕ









tψp = 0 (1.28)
xt : − λ
1
tΦx (xt, kt) + λ
5
t = 0 (1.29)
lt : λ
2




tϕw = 0 (1.30)
ut : λ
2
tfu (kt, ut, zt)− λ
5
t δ
′ (ut) kt − λ
1
tΦu (xt, kt) = 0 (1.31)
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st : − λ
1
t [η (θt) εt + κ
′ (st)] + λ
4
tη (θt) + ψλ
7
tη (θt) εt = 0 (1.32)
εt : − λ
1




tη (θt) st = 0 (1.33)
θt : − λ
1
tη
′ (θt) εtst + λ
4
tη
′ (θt) st + λ
6
tµ
′ (θt) εt − ψλ
7
tη
′ (θt) εtst = 0 (1.34)




t ζt = 0 (1.35)






λ7t = 0 (1.36)




t = 0 (1.37)
And the corresponding envelope conditions are:
Vk (kt, nt−1, bt,Γt) = −λ
1
tΦk(xt, kt) + λ
5
t (1− δ(ut)) + λ
2
tfk(kt, ut, zt) (1.38)
Vb (kt, nt−1, bt,Γt) = −λ
1
t (1.39)




First, I will proceed to derive expressions for all multipliers in the model. From





Replacing the expression in (1.41) into equations (1.29), (1.36), (1.39), (1.30),(1.32),


























































′(ut)kt + Φu(xt, kt) (1.47)
Similarly, using λ1t and λ
2
t from equations (1.41) and (1.45), respectively, and
















The next step is to derive expressions for the dynamic equations of the model
associated with the choices of k and n, as well as the pricing equation, using the
multipliers computed previously. First, consider the first-order condition for k in
(1.35) and the envelope condition (1.38) combined with the multipliers in (1.41),
(1.42) and (1.45). The resulting physical investment equation is given by
Φx (xt, kt) = λ
7





(1− δ (ut+1)) Φx (xt+1, kt+1)+
+
Φx (xt+1, kt+1) δ
′ (ut+1) kt+1
fu (kt+1, ut+1, zt+1)





Similarly, inserting λ3 and λ4 from equations (1.48), and (1.46), respectively,
into equation (1.37) and the envelope condition (1.40) results in the dynamic equa-
















































Finally, the pricing equation that specifies the discount granted to new cus-
tomers is obtained by combining equations (1.34), (1.41), (1.46), and (1.43), and



















CPS monthly files are obtained from IPUMS for the period 1980m1 to 2015m12.
Based on the 2010 Occupation Code List, the first category of sales-related occupa-
tions includes the following activities: first-line supervisors of sales workers (4700);
cashiers (4720); counter and rental clerks (4740); parts salesperson (4750); retail
salesperson (4760); advertising sales agents (4800); insurance sales agents (4810); se-
55
curities, commodities and financial services sales agents (4820); travel agents (4830);
sales representatives services, all other (4840); sales representatives, wholesale and
manufacturing (4850); models, demonstrators, and product promoters (4900); real
estate brokers and sales agents (4920); sales engineers (4930); telemarketers (4940);
door-to-door sales workers, news and street vendors, and related workers (4950);
and sales-related workers, all others (4965). The second category excludes cashiers
(4720) and counter and rental clerks (4740) from the first category. The third cate-
gory adds to the second the following activities: managers in marketing, advertising
and public relations (30); purchasing managers (150); buyers and purchasing agents,
farm products (510); wholesale and retail buyers, except farm products (520); pur-
chasing agents, except wholesale, retail, and farm products (530); and economists
and market researchers (1800). Finally, the fourth category excludes from the third
category first-line supervisors of sales workers (4700).
All employment series produced from CPS monthly files are seasonally ad-
justed using Tramo-Seats. Quarterly series are obtained as the average of the cor-
responding months.
1.B.2 Compustat Data
I use quarterly data collected from CRSP/Compustat and rating files from the third
quarter of 1992 to to fourth quarter of 2013. I delete observations with negative
total assets (atq), negative sales (salesq), negative cash and marketable securities
(cheq), cash and marketable securities greater than total assets, firms that are not
incorporated in the U.S, firms in the financial sector (firms with two-digit SIC codes
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between 60 and 69), firms in the utilities sector (firms with two-digit SIC codes
equals to 49) and firms involved in major takeover operations.
Investment is measured as the ratio of quarterly capital expenditure (capxy)
to the lag property, plant and equipment (ppentq). Net debt issuance is computed
as long-term debt issuance (dltisy) minus long-term retirement (dltry) divided by
lagged assets.15 Notice that some of these variables can be affected by industry
seasonality. To deal with the seasonal component of the data, sample means are
computed by controlling directly with seasonal dummies, and matching regressions
are performed using identical quarters in different periods.
Several measures of financial reliance are constructed to evaluate their rele-
vance in investment recovery. The classification for these firms is determined before
the crisis; specifically, the second quarter of 2006 is selected as the relevant date for
computations. I define a bank-related firm as a firm with two or more loan facilities
with the same U.S lead bank in the five years before 2006 according to Dealscan as
in Kahle and Stulz (2013).16
A second group of firms is constructed based on their leverage. The first
category in this group consists of firms in the top quintile of leverage at 2006q2.
A first subgroup includes firms with high leverage and a bank loan or revolver at
the end of 2005 and 2006, according to information obtained from CapitalIQ. This
15 Capital expenditures, aggregate equity issuance, aggregate equity repurchases, long term debt
issuance and long-term retirement are reported on a year-to-date basis. Quarterly values for these
variables are obtained by subtracting the lagged value from the current value in all quarters, with
exception of the first.
16 I consider a lead bank as those identified as the lead arranger in Dealscan. In case lead-arranger
credit is missing, a lead bank is also identified as the lender whose role in the database has been
specified as Admin Agent, Agent, Arranger or Lead Bank.
57
group can be seen as complementary to firms in the bank-related group. Following
Chaney et al. (2012), I construct a second subgroup of highly leveraged firms with
access to collateral, which is determined by real estate assets proprietorship. Real
estate is computed using annual files from Compustat to increase the number of
firms represented in the sample. The measure of real estate is the sum of buildings
(fatb), land and improvement (fatl), and construction in progress (fatp). I include
in this group firms in the first quintile of leverage who report consecutively non-
negative real estate assets for the last 5 year prior to 2006.17 Finally, I construct a
subgroup of firms with high leverage and low liquidity based on cash holding. This
category consists of firms in the top quintile of leverage at 2006q2 and the lowest
two quintiles of cash holdings in each quarter during the 3 years previous to the
second quarter of 2006.
The matching estimator is computed based on two categorical variables and
five non-categorical variables. Firms are exactly matched on industry and credit-
rating categories. Industry categories are given by two-digit SIC codes. Credit
ratings (splticrm) are defined as investment grade (AAA to BBB-), speculative
rating (SD to BB+), and unrated. Matching is also based on the market-to-book
ratio, cash flows, size, cash holdings, and leverage. The market-to-book ratio is
defined as the ratio of total assets (atq) plus market capitalization (prccq×cshoq)
minus common equity (ceqq) to total assets. Cash flow is defined as the ratio of
net income (ibq) plus depreciation and amortization (dpq) to the lag of total assets.
17 In order to increase the sample size, when possible real estate was computed by subtracting
from the gross value of property, plant and equipment all the other components of this asset
category that do not correspond to real estate (e.g. natural resources, machinery and equipment,
leases, etc.)
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Cash holdings is the ratio of cash and short-term investment (cheq) to total assets.
Size is the log of total assets. Leverage is computed as the ratio of short-term
liabilities (dlcq) and long-term liabilities (dlttq) to total assets.
1.C Sales and Financial Constraints
The conclusions of the model trigger important implications for economic activity
at the firm level. It predicts that the customer base will be negatively affected by a
financial shock. Although there are not proper ways to account for the full variation
in the customer base from the database used in this chapter, it is possible to asses
the variation on real sales as a proxy for changes in economic activity. To analyze
how sales from firms with low liquidity have evolved in the post-crisis period the
following difference in difference approach is used:
salesit = α + β1Postt + β2liquidi + β3Postt · liquidi +X
′θ + εit (1.52)
Where liquidi corresponds to firms in the liquidity ratio of of cash and short-
term investment over assets computed as in appendix1.B. Postt corresponds to the
period encompassing 2009q3 − 2010q2. And sales correspond to the sales reported
by firms (saleq) deflated by consumers CPI. The vector X contains size, industry
and seasonal dummies. The results of the previous equation are reported in Table
1.C.1. Of particular interest is the coefficient β3 which reflects the behavior of
sales for firms with low ex-ante liquidity levels relative to firms with higher levels
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of liquidity. These firms have experience lower levels of sales relative to firms with
higher liquidity. Although, it is not possible to fully disentangle the reasons for
such behavior, it can give insights on the long-lasting effects of financial frictions on
economic recovery.
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Chapter 2: Liquidity Spirals, Leverage and Asset Prices
1 Introduction
The Great Recession was characterized by a sharp deterioration in the borrowing
capacity of entrepreneurs due to a generalized drop in assets liquidity. This drop
in liquidity surges not only as a consequence of a plunge in asset prices but also
the contraction in loan-to-value ratios. However, our understanding on the chan-
nels through which changes in loan-to-value ratios affect economic activity are still
limited. This chapter aims to fill this gap by providing a theoretical framework to
analyze how loan-to-value ratios are an equilibrium outcome in the economy, which
is jointly determined with asset prices. This joint determination of asset prices
and loan-to-value are key to understand how liquidity shocks are amplified in the
economy.
As Figure 2.1 depicts, the loan-to-value or leverage (I will use these two terms
interchangeably all along this chapter) is procyclical.1 This suggests that during bad
times liquidity can drop due to the reduction in the amount of resources attainable
by unit of collateral pledged. This drop in liquidity can occur even in the absence
1 The measure of leverage used in this paper correspond to debt to disposable income ratio,
which is the measure of leverage discussed in Boz and Mendoza (2014).
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of substantial changes in asset prices, and it would suffice to produce a contraction
in credit and thus in economic activity. However, as Figure 2.1 also depicts, there
exists an important correlation between the evolution of asset prices and leverage.
This captures the idea that these two measures of liquidity cannot be considered
independently.
This chapter introduces a model in which asymmetric information about the
quality of assets shapes the relationship leverage and asset prices. Leverage con-
denses the ability of agents to raise funds via collateralized lending. The price of
assets condenses the ability of agents to raise funds via direct sales of these assets.2
On the one hand, leverage is key to determine asset prices in the economy.
Leverage sets the opportunity cost of selling assets and, thus, it affects its supply
curve. Furthermore, leverage also allows agents to finance capital purchases by either
increasing the amount of resources available to fund them or by allowing agents to
buy assets on margin, affecting the demand curve. By shaping both supply and
demand curves, leverage determines the equilibrium level of asset prices.
On the other hand, asset prices influence the level of leverage in the economy.
When capital is heterogeneous in terms of its quality, agents optimally decide the
type of asset to sell and the type of assets to keep and pledge as collateral, in
exchange for credit. Asset prices implicitly determine the quality of those units
kept as collateral by setting the opportunity cost of selling assets. Since shifts in
prices affect the composition and quality of collateral units, it determines how much
2 These concepts are echoed in Brunnermeier et al. (2012)’s notion that capital can be dis-
tinguished by two main liquidity properties: its market liquidity, when it can be sold off easily
with limited price impact. And its funding liquidity, when the asset is preserved and pledged as
collateral.
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financial intermediaries are willing to lend, given their expectations on the quality
of assets pledged.
There are two main contributions of this chapter to the existing literature.
First, it delivers a model in which leverage is procyclical a feature that is present
in the data (Figure 2.1) but absent in macroeconomic models. In my model, during
good times, the demand for assets is higher. This implies that more qualities of
assets are traded and on average better qualities are pledged as collateral. As the
expected quality of the assets used as collateral increases, financial intermediaries
are willing to lend more by increasing the loan-to-value ratio of the economy.3
Second, my model provides a positive linkage between liquidity shocks and
asset prices. In absence of additional shocks or rigidities, this feature is difficult
to capture in models encompassing liquidity shocks which are based on Shi (2015).
In these model a negative liquidity shock contracts the supply of assets and create
a boom in asset prices. On the contrary, in my model a negative liquidity shock
reduces leverage and affects the composition of capital trades in the economy. Its
effect is twofold: first, it reduces the opportunity cost of selling assets triggering a
boost in the supply for assets; second, it reduces the resources available to finance
capital purchases leading to a contraction in the demand curve. Both factors impact
negatively asset prices. The procyclicality of leverage reinforces this spiral, as loan-
to-value ratios fall on impact.4
3 This feature of the model formalizes the ideas developed in Shi (2015). The author stresses
that leverage can be increasing in the degree of liquidity in equity, in order to capture the idea
that lenders who can sell collateral more easily in the market are more willing to lend a higher
amount backed by collateral.
4 Similar attempts to generate asset prices busts after a liquidity shock are found in Guerron-
Quintana and Jinnai (2015), who consider the response of negative shocks in presence of endogenous
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Fig. 2.1: Leverage and Asset Prices



































































Source. Author’s calculations based on information from FRED and Standard and Poors.
Leverage vs. Credit Cycles. This chapter introduces endogenous leverage
in an otherwise standard model of borrowing constraints. It also explores how
liquidity shocks are amplified through the relationship between leverage and asset
prices. The literature on financial frictions influenced by the work of Bernanke et al.
(1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) have focused
on the amplification generated by the credit cycle. To be more specific, the credit
cycle refers to the idea that a drop in asset prices or wealth makes more difficult to
borrow, hampers productive processes and triggers a vicious circle of further asset
prices and investment deterioration (debt-deflation theory). Instead, the focus of




Why is it important to consider loan-to-value ratios? As shown in Figure 2.1,
loan-to-value ratios are highly procyclical. For instance, the normal down payment
for housing financed by nongovernment mortgages fell from 13% in 2000 to 2.7%
in 2006, and then rose to 16% in 2007 (Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2014). Leverage
falls in bad times creating an additional deterrent on the ability of entrepreneurs to
finance investment projects. More importantly, it is the impact of leverage on asset
prices what can bring about a larger deterioration in liquidity; so it is the fall in
leverage what drives prices down and it is the combined effect of a fall in leverage
and prices what make credit conditions more pervasive during periods of economic
distress.
However, the role of leverage has been particularly absent in the literature
on borrowing constraints. This literature is characterized by imposing a limit in
the ability to borrow, which is determined by a fraction of the market value of
the income or assets offered as collateral. In general, these limits are expressed in
terms of a collateral constraint of the form bt+1 ≤ κg(qt, yt, kt+1, kt, bt), as stated in
Mendoza (2006). The collateral function g(·) could depend on a vector of market
prices q, on income y, on asset holding k, or on existing debt b.5
In these models κ reflects the loan-to-value or leverage associated with external
5 Several functional forms have been considered as collateral functions. In Aiyagari and Gertler
(1999) it takes the form g(·) = ptαt+1k where pt correspond to the price of equity and αt+1 are










corresponds to income from
tradables and non-tradables, respectively. More generally, as in Kocherlakota (2000), borrowing
constraints take the form g(·) = qtk in which k in an inelastic factor. In presence of uncertainty as
in Monacelli (2009) or Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), borrowing constraints g(·) = Et(qtk) limit
the ability to borrow by the expected future value of assets.
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borrowing. In models of borrowing constraints, from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to
Bianchi (2011), Monacelli (2009) or Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) this parameter
is constant implying that entrepreneurs borrow a constant fraction of the value of
assets used as collateral. In models with a focus in regions of the state-space in
which the borrowing constraint is not-binding, a constant κ imposes an upper limit
on how much leverage is attainable in the economy, but yet, leverage is constant
when the borrowing constraint binds. This approach is not only at odds with the
evidence on leverage but also undermines potential mechanisms of amplification.
More recently, Bianchi et al. (2012), Bianchi and Mendoza (2013) and Boz
and Mendoza (2014) have introduced a stochastic Markov process to capture the
dynamics of leverage in normal and bad times. However, the exogeneity of leverage
does not allow us to understand how it can be determined in equilibrium, but more
importantly, its interaction with asset prices. I depart from this view of exogenously
determined leverage to introduce a framework in which leverage is determined in
equilibrium. More specifically, I show how leverage is jointly determined in equilib-
rium with asset prices nesting in the same model leverage and credit driven cycles.
Overview of the Model. This chapter builds on the model of Kurlat (2013).
I extend his model by allowing collateralized borrowing and a continuum of capital
qualities as in Bigio (2015). Capital in my model is composed of a continuum of
heterogenous qualities. Each quality of capital is associated with a different rate
of depreciation or Solow neutral productivity shock; low capital qualities depreciate
faster than high quality types. At the beginning of the period, entrepreneurs receive
an idiosyncratic productivity shock in their ability to transform consumption goods
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into capital goods. This heterogeneity in the transformation technology allows for
segmentation; highly productive entrepreneurs find it optimal to sell more units of
capital with higher quality, while less productive entrepreneurs sell only their low
quality units and purchase capital in the market at a pooling price.
The economy also contains risk-neutral and competitive financial intermedi-
aries who transfer consumption goods to entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, there exists
limited enforceability of debt contracts. The presence of financial intermediaries
allows entrepreneurs to finance capital purchases not only with internal but also ex-
ternal funds. The presence of limited enforceability implies an endogenous collateral
constraint on debt contracts. This feature of my model is important as collateral is
not homogenous but rather is a mixture of different qualities of capital known only
by the entrepreneur, creating a new role for low quality assets as a possible device
to relax the borrowing constraint.6
In this setting the price of assets is not exclusively determined by fundamentals,
and in particular higher leverage could create higher asset prices. In other words,
asset prices not only reflect the interaction between demand and supply, but also
the value of each unit of capital as collateral. When one unit of collateral is able
to sustain higher borrowing, entrepreneurs who were initially willing to sell their
assets may no longer find this optimal. Instead, they can keep and use those units
of capital as collateral reducing the supply of assets and in this way driving up the
equilibrium price. In addition, buyers of assets can use this capital to borrow more,
6 These assumptions are in line with the findings in Ajello (2010), who stresses that entrepreneurs
cannot finance new investment opportunities solely by liquidating assets , but also rely on external
resources.
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increasing the demand for assets, which also drives up the price.
The presence of limited enforceability and heterogenous collateral is a major
departure from the existing literature studying financial frictions due to borrow-
ing constraints. Consider for instance the case with no asymmetric information in
which capital is homogenous and does not depreciate. Then, when intermediaries
seize capital in case of default, one unit of capital seized becomes one unit of re-
salable capital. Abstracting from possible costs associated with capital foreclosure,
intermediaries can lend the exact value of capital pledged (i.e leverage is equal to
one).
However, in this model there is a distinction between the ex-ante value of
capital pledged by entrepreneurs and the ex-post value of capital available for re-
sale. Since capital quality is heterogenous and since borrowers are privately informed
about the value of collateral, intermediaries need to form expectations about how
many units of resalable capital will emerge from one unit of capital pledged. This
expectation is important in determining the endogenous degree of leverage of the
economy.
Related Literature. Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015) show that information
asymmetries about asset quality can determine endogenously the degree of market
liquidity in the economy, that is, the price at which assets can be traded.7 This
chapter extends this framework to analyze how these asymmetries are also associ-
ated with the liquidity obtained from collateralized borrowing in the presence of
7 Authors show that under given circumstances markets can totally collapse and market liquidity
dries out as the closing price for assets is equal to zero.
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collateral constraints. In my model investment opportunities can be financed not
only through direct selling of capital but also by issuing debt from financial interme-
diaries. However, limited enforcement require the presence of collateral to guarantee
debt contracts. Thus, entrepreneurs face a decision on the limits of capital sales as
they are at the same time giving up capital to be used as collateral.
Nevertheless, there is a deep contrast between this literature [GF, hereafter]
and this chapter. First, unlike GF segmentation in this chapter arises through
idiosyncratic productivity shocks instead of heterogenous beliefs. It is the ability
to transform assets in consumption the key to determine buyers and sellers in the
economy. In GF is the perception about the returns of assets the one that determines
buyers and sellers. So the economy is composed of a set of optimists agents (buyers)
and a set of pessimists agents (sellers).
Second, this chapter presents leverage as the maximum amount of borrowing
per unit of collateral pledged. Leverage is determined by the expectations about the
quality of assets pledged as collateral. In GF, every agent delivers the same capital
as collateral; lenders need only to worry about collateral and not about the identity
of borrowers. Leverage in GF is determined by a Value at Risk (VaR) condition on
debt contracts; agents can trade different sets of contracts specifying the amount of
the loan, the collateral and the interest rate. GF proves that in equilibrium only
the contract that guarantees that the VaR is zero can be traded, and in this way
leverage is pinned down.
This chapter is similar to Parlatore (2017), who focus on the decision of traders
to sell or keep financial assets to use them as collateral. Informational asymmetries
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are also present in her model, but I consider the ability of productive asset instead
of financial ones to deliver liquidity.
This chapter builds on the model of Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015). I take
from these documents the idea that entrepreneurs finance investment projects by
selling capital of different qualities under asymmetric information at a pooling price.
I extend Kurlat’s framework by introducing financial intermediaries and limited en-
forceability of debt contracts. Unlike his model, this chapter separates liquidity in
terms of capital sales and collateralized borrowing. Liquidity obtained through ca-
pital sales involves the loose of capital proprietorship since sales entail the transfer
of assets from one entrepreneur to another. Collateralized borrowing Entrepreneurs
can finance investment projects by using capital unsold as collateral. This extension
allows me to analyze some novel features in the literature: the surge of endogenous
leverage as a result of asymmetric information in the quality of collateral, the ex-
isting simultaneous determinacy between asset prices and leverage in equilibrium,
the procyclicality of leverage and the effect on asset prices of changes of financial
innovation.
This chapter also builds on the idea that deleveraging shocks create disruptive
real effects in economies subject to borrowing constraints during periods of finan-
cial distress, as suggested in Boz and Mendoza (2010), Perri and Quadrini (2014),
Sudipto et al. (2011) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). However, this model
departs from this literature, which treats leverage as an exogenously determined
variable or endogenously determined by changes in expected liquidation prices.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
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baseline model and imposes the necessary conditions for the existence of equilibrium.
Section 3 describes the conditions for leverage procyclicality and the existence of
liquidity spirals. Section 4 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
This section presents the baseline model and illustrates the solutions and main mech-
anisms behind the relationship between leverage and asset prices. In this section,
I abstract from labor and saving decisions to capture analytically the interaction
between different sources of liquidity. The model is formulated in discrete time with
an infinite horizon in which endogenous liquidity arises from a problem of adverse
selection in line with Kurlat (2013).
The economy is composed of a unit mass of entrepreneurs indexed by i, risk
neutral and competitive financial intermediaries and a competitive producer of con-
sumption goods. Entrepreneurs in this model are the owners of capital and un-
dertake physical investment by transforming consumption goods into capital. Each
capital unit is formed by a continuum of heterogeneous pieces, which differ in their
degree of depreciation. A competitive firm rents capital from entrepreneurs to pro-
duce consumption goods.
2.1 Environment, Technology and Financing Conditions
Production Technology. Consumption goods are produced by a competitive firm with
aggregate capital Kt =
∫
kt(i)di as the sole input in a standard constant returns to
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scale production function of the form yt = AtKt. This production function is subject
to an aggregate shock At ∈ A on productivity. I assume aggregate productivity
follows a Markov process in the neighborhood of its constant unconditional mean
A.
Capital Structure. Capital is heterogeneous. Each capital unit kt owned by
entrepreneurs is composed of a continuum of pieces identified by their quality ε ∈
[0,∞]. The distribution of qualities is determined by a common p.d.f f(ε) which
follows an exponential distribution invariant across entrepreneurs and time. The
quality of a capital unit ε is a shock broadly interpreted as the combination of
depreciation and a idiosyncratic Solow-neutral productivity shock. This quality
is obtained from a bijective, increasing and differentiable function δ(ε) : [0,∞] →
[0,∞], with unconditional mean δ̄. At each period, each quality is randomly assigned
to a different degree of shocks. This quality remains private information and can
only be learnt by others after depreciation takes place.
Capital is fully separable and entrepreneurs can decide either to sell or keep
specific qualities. The existing units of capital at the beginning of each period for
any entrepreneur can be denoted as k
∫
f(ε)dε, and the efficiency units remaining
after scaled for different shock realizations as k
∫
δ(ε)f(ε)dε.
Entrepreneurs and Investment Technology. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs
i with unitary mass, who undertake capital investment. At each period entrepreneurs
can transform one unit of consumption into θ units of capital. Where θ is an i.i.d
random variable across entrepreneurs and time. This investment technology is drawn
from a distribution with cumulative density function dG with support in [θ0, θ1]. The
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realization of investment technology is private information as it is only observed by
the specific entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs can finance investment opportunities by either selling their ex-
isting capital holdings in exchange for consumption goods or by collateralized bor-
rowing from financial intermediaries. In such way, entrepreneurs can fraction their
capital units such that the decision on which capital units to sell kst entails the
choice of specific qualities that the entrepreneur will trade in the market. Denoting
ι(ε) : [0, 1] → {0, 1} as the indicator function representing the qualities from the ex-
isting capital stock that entrepreneurs choose to sale, capital sales can be expressed
as kst = k
∫
ιt(ε)f(ε)dε.
Capital trades occur under asymmetric information as the realization of pro-
ductivity θ and the quality ε of capital units offered are private information at the
moment of sale. This requires all capital units to be traded at a pooling price pt.
8
Alternatively, entrepreneurs can finance their investment opportunities by
means of collateralized debt. They can borrow bt+1 units of consumption goods
from financial intermediaries at a constant interest rate R. However, limited en-
forcement on debt contracts requires the presence of collateral as a mean to enforce
repayment. The debt market opens before the spot market for capital, so only
capital units not offered by entrepreneurs k
∫
(1− ιt(ε)) f(ε)dε serve the role of col-
lateral. Asymmetric information on productivity prevents entrepreneurs to pledge
new capital created; this is because in a case of capital foreclosure, entrepreneurs
8 When the quality of capital units is publicly known, capital trades occur at differentiated price
function that depends on the degree of depreciation. In general, each quality ε would be traded at
a price p(ε) with pε > 0.
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can divert part of this new capital by claiming lower productivity realizations.
Loan-to-value ratio. In case of default, intermediaries seize the capital used as
collateral and sell it to non-defaulting entrepreneurs through a bargaining process.
Given information asymmetries, intermediaries ignore the exact quality of the capital
that was used as collateral and the units available to resale after depreciation. This
feature creates a wedge between the ex-ante value of capital pledged and the ex-
post value of capital available to resale, which determines the endogenous degree of
leverage in the economy.9
As intermediaries are not able to sell all the units originally pledged as collat-
eral, they are not willing to lend more than a fraction κt (i.e. the loan-to-value ratio
or leverage) of the value of capital pledged as collateral. This fraction accounts for
the depreciation of the collateral and is subject to an exogenous financial shock (ζt)
which follows an AR(1) process. This shock comes as a reduced form of more struc-
tural shocks which result in changes in the liquidation value of capital (“liquidity
shock”). I assume debt is default-free so no entrepreneur defaults in equilibrium.
Aggregate State. The aggregate state in the economy is given by the aggregate
stock of capital Kt ∈ K, the aggregate level of debt Bt ∈ B, the aggregate produc-
tivity shock At ∈ A and the financial (liquidity) shock ζt ∈ X. This aggregate state
is summarized by the vector Γt = {At, ζt, Kt, Bt} and Γt ∈ A× X×K× B.
Timing of Events. A period is divided into four stages: entrepreneurs’ deci-
sions, production, investment and consumption. At the beginning of the period ag-
9 An alternative interpretation also consistent with the existence of a wedge between the ex-
ante units of capital used as collateral and the ex-post units available to resale is the following:
Intermediaries seize capital before depreciation occurs but are only able to resell these units when
depreciations shocks have been realized.
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gregate shocks (A, ξ) are realized and overall depreciation takes place; entrepreneurs
get a draw in their investment technology θ. Based on the aggregate and individual
state realizations, during the first stage entrepreneurs decide whether to undertake
investment or instead increase their capital stock by buying assets. Additionally,
they decide on the fraction of capital offered in the spot market and the fraction
kept to use as collateral.
During the production stage, a representative firm rents all the capital stock
from entrepreneurs to produce consumption goods. Simultaneously, debt market
opens and entrepreneurs repay their obligations and issue new debt. In case of de-
fault (off-equilibrium path), financial intermediaries seize the collateral of defaulting
entrepreneurs and sell it to non-defaulting ones through a bargaining process. At
this stage the valuation of capital is determined by its marginal productivity and
not by asymmetric information about its quality. During the investment stage,
entrepreneurs seek to complete the financing of their investment opportunities or
simply increase their capital stock by purchasing assets. Investors sell part of their
assets not used previously as collateral in exchange for consumption goods. In the
final stage entrepreneurs consume their remaining consumption units.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs receive a productivity shock θ (hereafter, θ−entrepreneur) in their
ability to transform consumption goods into capital.10 Entrepreneurs maximize
their consumption level (ct) by choosing the level of investment (xt) to undertake,
10 More precisely, a θ−entrepreneur is an entrepreneur i who is mapped to a productivity real-
ization θ on her ability to transform consumption into capital goods.
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the amount of capital to purchase (kpt ), the units of capital to sell (k
s
t ), the amount
to borrow from financial intermediaries (bt+1) and the level of capital accumulation
(kt+1) for a given exogenous state {Γt, θ}. The problem of a given entrepreneur is
as follows:








ct + xt + ptk
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where u(c) = log(c). Constraint (2.2) is the budget constraint in terms of consump-
tion goods. The right hand side corresponds to the initial resources available for
entrepreneurs coming from: capital rents (rtkt) net of previous debt repayments (bt)
at a constant interest rate R and capital sales (kst ). These resources are used for
direct consumption (ct), investment (xt) or capital purchases (k
p
t ). I abstract from
intermediation costs, thus capital sales and capital purchases are completed at a
unique pooling price pt.
Capital accumulation is presented in equation (2.3). The first term consists of
the remaining capital units owned by a θ−entrepreneur scaled by their depreciation;
76
these units are formed by their original capital stock kt net of sales k
s
t of specific
varieties ε. The second term stands for capital purchases; the quality of the units
acquired is unknown given the problem of asymmetric information. These capital
purchases are adjusted by entrepreneur’s beliefs about its market depreciation δb ∈
[0, 1]. In equilibrium these beliefs are equal to the realized market depreciation rate
and consistent with depreciation at the aggregate level. The last term in equation
(2.3) represents the proceeds from investment carried out in the previous period.
Entrepreneurs are subject to a borrowing constraint of the form (2.4). This
constraint states that an entrepreneur cannot borrow more than fraction κt of the
discounted re-sale value of the assets pledged as collateral.11 Only existing capital
at the contracting stage can be used as collateral; that is the initial state of capi-
tal proprietorship (kt) net of the asset sales (k
s
t ) during the period. We focus on
the solution in which constraint (2.4) is always binding. This assumption is con-
sistent with the solution around a small neighborhood of the steady state, where
entrepreneurial returns on savings are greater than the interest rate.12
The solution for the entrepreneur’s problem consists of breaking up the max-
imization problem into two stages: in a first stage, entrepreneurs decide the opti-
mal level for capital purchases and capital sales in order to maximize the liquidity
available for a given state {Γt, θ}. In a second stage, given the maximum level of
11 It is important to emphasize the existing distinction between the spot price of capital and
its resale price. On the one hand, the price at which capital is traded pt in equation (2.3) corre-
sponds to the pooling price of capital exchange under asymmetric information among entrepreneurs
(buyers and sellers). On the other hand, resale occurs between intermediaries and non-defaulting
entrepreneurs, and the final price is obtained via bargaining. As depreciation has already occurred,
the resale price (qt+1) in equation (2.4) reflects the valuation of each entrepreneur in terms of the
marginal rate of transformation of capital into consumption goods.
12 Additional discussion on this subject is presented along the lines of section (??)
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liquidity attainable entrepreneurs decide on the optimal levels of consumption and
savings. To ease the notation, define the discounted re-sale price as q̃t+1 = qt+1/R
and νt ≡ (pt − κtq̃t+1)
−1 as the inverse of net capital downpayments. The decision
on capital sales and purchases are summarized in lemma (1).
Lemma 1. (Composition and Capital Sales). Optimality conditions for a θ− en-




any realization of θ < θb the entrepreneur becomes a buyer of capital and does not





such that for any given realization of
productivity θ all qualities below εb are sold.
Proof. See appendix (2.A).
Lemma (1) states the importance of productivity realizations θ to segmenting
entrepreneurs into buyers and investors. In particular, θb reflects the market return
(in terms of capital) of one unit of consumption used to purchase assets. Intuitively,
the return for an entrepreneur with a low productivity draw (θ < θb) is higher by
purchasing capital units than directly investing. These type of entrepreneurs rebuild
their capital stock acquiring capital from more productive entrepreneurs in exchange
for consumption goods. On the contrary, for the most productive entrepreneurs
(θ > θb) as the return from investment is higher, it is optimal to rebuild their
capital stock with the returns from direct investments.
As the distribution of capital qualities is continuous, entrepreneurs find it
optimal to sell at least a fraction of their existing capital units as stated in part (b)
of Lemma 1. This fraction is increasing in productivity θ and the current price level
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pt; this implies that more productive entrepreneurs finance their investment with a
higher share of capital sales over collateralized borrowing. In addition, the fraction
of capital units to sell are negatively related to the loan-to-value ratio κt. Notice
that the loan-to-value margin sets the opportunity cost of selling one unit of capital
in terms of the foregone units available to be pledged as collateral. In other words,
a higher leverage level reduces the supply of capital units offered by entrepreneurs
in the market.
Lemma 2. (Capital Purchases). For a given θ−entrepreneur such that θ < θb the









Proof. This proposition comes from combining part (a) in lemma (1) with
the capital accumulation equation in (2.3) in the case in which investment is zero
(i = 0).
Lemma (2) states the total amount of capital that is affordable for capital
purchasers. Based on the results from lemma (1) and lemma(2) we can define the
optimal amount of liquid resources that one unit of capital provides as lt in equation
(2.6). This amount combines the benefit from capital liquidation at a price pt, which
is referred to as market liquidity. And the benefit obtained by pledging capital as
collateral at a loan-to-value ratio κt, which is referred to as funding liquidity.
Definition 1. (Liquidity). Total liquidity is determined both by the value of capital
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Taking the optimal liquidity conditions in equation (2.6) and the amount avail-
able for capital purchases in equation (2.5), we can denote a θ−entrepreneurs’s net
worth nt as the returns from renting capital, the market and funding liquidity and
the replacement cost of capital for either investors or non-investors. All these re-
sources net of debt repayments. Entrepreneurs by choosing their optimal financing
decisions implicitly define the optimal level of net worth.
nt := kt
[








The entrepreneurs’ problem can be restated as a standard consumption-saving
decision in terms of the net worth as follows:











(nt − ct) (2.9)
Given logarithmic preferences, entrepreneurs consume a constant fraction of




nt. Since policy func-
tions are linear in net worth, the model can be easily aggregated. Next subsection
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presents the conditions on the determination of the equilibrium price for capital
trades.
Asset Prices
The price for capital trades is determined by the intersection between supply and
demand coming from entrepreneurs. The supply of assets is obtained by integrating
all different qualities offered in the economy by all different entrepreneurs. Based
in the conditions stated in lemma (1), the aggregate supply of asset in the economy
corresponds to:










where Kt represents aggregate capital and Fε(·) the cumulative density function of
qualities. The equilibrium is also characterized by the market depreciation beliefs.
These beliefs corresponds in equilibrium to the depreciation market rate of the units
supplied.
Proposition 1. The supply of assets is monotonically increasing in prices (p) and
monotonically decreasing in leverage (κ).
Proof. See appendix (2.A).
The formal proof is presented in the appendix, here I sketch a more intu-
itive line of argument. Supply conditions are uniquely determined by the quality
of units offered by each entrepreneur. Notice that the quality of units sold by a
θ−entrepreneur (εb) is increasing in the value of the asset p and decreasing in lever-
age κ. On the one hand, an increase in asset prices boosts the amount of liquid funds
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available from direct sales, making capital sales more attractive, and thus increasing
the overall supply of assets. On the other hand, leverage reflects the opportunity
cost of selling assets in terms of the renounced units of capital. A higher leverage
makes capital sales less attractive since the necessary units to be sold in order to
reach a given level of liquidity are lower, thus reducing the overall supply of assets.
It is implicitly assumed that entrepreneurs purchase a diversified portfolio of
capital, so the market depreciation holds also at the individual level. Based on
equation (2.10) market depreciation beliefs are presented in lemma (3):
Lemma 3. (Depreciation Beliefs) The belief on market depreciation from capital





















Proof. See Appendix (2.A).
Where δ̄ correspond to the average depreciation of aggregate capital. This
implies that the equilibrium rate of market depreciation corresponds to a fraction of
the overall depreciation rate δ̄. This fraction reflects the average rate of depreciation
from the units offered in the market.
The demand for assets is obtained by integrating capital purchases for all non-
investors entrepreneurs. The mass of non-investors is determined along the lines of
lemma (1), and their demand is derived by combining lemma (2) with the saving-
consumption optimal decision of entrepreneurs. The aggregate demand for capital
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is represented in equation (2.12):


























The equilibrium price is implicitly determined by equation (2.13). The level
of leverage κ in the economy will determine the final price at which capital is traded
by shaping the supply and demand for assets.
e(p, κ, A) = St(p, κ)−Dt(p, κ, A) with e(p, κ, A) = 0 if pt > 0 (2.13)
Since the supply of assets is unambiguously increasing in prices, as pointed
out in proposition 1, Dp < 0 is a sufficient condition for the existence of p
∗ such
that e(p∗, κ, A) = 0 for any {κ,A}. Notice that the behavior of demand is driven
by changes in the capital purchasers cutoff θb. While it is difficult to impose general
conditions for θb to be decreasing in p, it is possible to show that for a reasonable
calibrations, the assumption θbp < 0 holds in more than 98% of the state space as
presented in Figure 2.1.
Next section presents how resale prices and leverage are determined in the
economy, and imposes conditions for the existence and uniqueness of such solution.
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Notes.The simulation corresponds to parameters presented in section ??. The distribution of capital units is assumed
exponential and the distribution of entrepreneurs technology is assumed to be log-normal.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries are risk neutral and operate in a competitive environment.
They transfer resources in terms of consumption goods to entrepreneurs. The as-
sociation with entrepreneurs is characterized by a problem of limited enforceability
of debt contracts.13 As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) limited enforcement of repay-
ments implies that any exchange or resources between entrepreneurs and interme-
diaries must be limited by a collateral constraint as an enforcement device.
13 As stated in Hart and Moore (1994) this limited enforceability relies on the fact that restrictions
on the freedom of entrepreneurs to walk away cannot be imposed.
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Capital Resale Prices
As stated previously, when entrepreneurs default, financial intermediaries seize the
capital pledged as collateral and sell it to non-defaulting entrepreneurs. These resales
occur during production stage in which entrepreneurs are homogenous: first, since
the heterogeneity in their ability to transform consumption into capital goods is
only relevant during the investment stage; and second, since there is no distinction
about the quality of the units rented to the competitive firm as all units have been
already scaled by their corresponding depreciation.
Intermediaries and entrepreneurs bargain over the price of these assets. En-
trepreneur’s valuation is determined by the marginal rate of return of capital. As
the production function is linear in capital, the distribution entrepreneurs valuation
is determined by the process followed by aggregate productivity At ∈ A. We con-
sider the case in which intermediaries make a sequence of offers until agreement is
reached and take the limit as the time between offers goes to zero.14
Assumption 1. For any realization of At ∈ A intermediaries’ valuation is always
lower than entrepreneur’s.
Assumption (1) guarantees that is more efficient for intermediaries to sell ca-
pital rather than keeping it. It is possible to show that there exists a unique perfect
14 This feature of the model is consistent with the fact that after foreclosures, assets are sold at
discount values. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) posit that asset resales entail additional costs, which
limit the potential gains for the seller. When capital is industry specific, potential buyers with
the highest valuation are often those in the same industry who generally also experience financial
distress. For instance, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) estimate the wedge between purchase price and
resale price for machine tools at aerospace plants to be about 69% and the wedge for structural
equipment to be 95%.
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Bayesian equilibrium in which in the first round intermediaries offers qt+1 = A(1),
which corresponds to the marginal productivity of capital at the lowest possible
realization of At ∈ A, and this offer is accepted by entrepreneurs.
15
Notice that intermediaries can predict the resale price qt+1 at period period
t. This is as result that the resale price does not depend on the current realization
of productivity, but on the lower limit of its support. Nevertheless, the uncertainty
about the quality of assets is still present. So this model is able to separate changes
in borrowing capacity coming from anticipated variations in the resale price of assets
from the ones coming from a change in the expectations about the quality of assets
used as collateral.
Leverage
Consider the case in which a θ−entrepreneur defaults. In that scenario, financial
intermediaries seize the capital pledged as collateral. The left hand side of equation
(2.14) represents the amount borrowed by a θ−entrepreneur based on the collateral
available at period t, in concordance to (2.4). The right hand side corresponds to
the value (discounted) of capital resales available for intermediaries. As previously
stated, capital resales are subject to liquidity shocks of the form ζt, which implies
that intermediaries can only sell a fraction of the capital seized after depreciation
15 For a formal proof, See Gul et al. (1986)
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Amount available to resell at t+ 1
(2.14)
Thus, the model is characterized the existence of an endogenous wedge between
the ex-ante (before depreciation) capital pledged, and the ex-post value of capital,
which corresponds to the effective units (after non-homogenous depreciation) of
capital that intermediaries can re-sell after foreclosure.
Definition 2. (Leverage) Leverage corresponds to the maximum loan-to-value ratio
that guarantees a non-negative payoff for financial intermediaries after default.
Based on the previous definition, we can solve for κt in equation (2.14) and
integrate over the probability of facing a θ−entrepreneur, so the optimal leverage
can be expressed as κt = ζtEθ
(
δ(ε) | ε > εb
)
. Intuitively, intermediaries adjust loan-
to-value ratios based on the expected quality of the units kept and used as collateral
by borrowers.
Leverage is endogenous and arises due to asymmetric information in the quality
of assets and not for variations in the valuation that intermediaries place to the price
of capital resales (see. Section (2.3). This separates this chapter from the existing
literature which considers leverage to be endogenous as a result of expected (or
unexpected) variations in the resale prices of capital foreclosed.16
Proposition 2. (Leverage) Leverage corresponds to the expected quality of units
16 For instance in Perri and Quadrini (2014) leverage is endogenous as a consequence of the
different valuations that potential buyers have about capital and that result in different liquidation
values.
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used as collateral for all entrepreneurs as defined in equation (2.15).












Proof. See appendix (2.A).
Where F̃ is the survival function, F̃ = 1 − F , and θ̄ is the unconditional quality
of entrepreneurs θ̄ =
∫ θ1
θ0
θdG(θ). As pointed out in Jones (1990) for δ(ε) > 0 and
E (δ(ε)) < ∞, the right-hand side of equation (2.15) exists and is finite. Also, for
f(·) log-concave and κ ∈ (0, 1), this expression is bounded and thus admits for
any given {p}, the existence of a {κ∗} which is a fixed-point solution to equation
(2.15). However, without further conditions on functional forms, the left-hand side
of equation (2.15) may not be necessarily monotonic in κ, thus, {κ∗} may not be
unique.
Lemma 4. For a linear depreciation function δ(ε) and the distributions of qualities
ε following an exponential distributions with mean δ̄, for any given {p}, there exists










Proof. See appendix (2.A).
For the case of exponential distributions, For a given θ, the mean of the conditional
distribution, given ε > εb, exceeds the mean of the unconditional distribution by the
quantity εb for all εb. This property of exponential distributions has been extensively
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discussed in Shanbhag (1970), Hamdan (1972), and Kotlarski (1972); it provides
higher analytical tractability to the leverage problem, allowing for a unique value
solving equation (2.15).
3 Leverage Procyclicality and Liquidity Spirals
The model presented in previous section shows how asset prices and leverage are
determined endogenously in equilibrium. This section explores the interaction of
these two variables when the economy face a productivity shock At ∈ A and a
liquidity shock ζt. A detailed description of the functional forms and parameters
used in the simulation is presented in Appendix 2.B.
Assumption 2. The conditionDκ(p




holds in the neighborhood of the equilibrium {p∗, κ∗}.
Assumption 2 guarantees the Jacobian for equations (2.13) and (2.15) to be
positive and is critical for the following propositions. A sufficient condition requires
the demand to be increasing in leverage Dκ > 0. This in turn requires that changes
in liquidity offset the potential decline in the mass of capital purchasers. More
specifically, changes in leverage affect the supply of assets and thus market depre-
ciation δb. If fewer units of capital are traded, the expected quality of these units
decline in equilibrium. In such way, θb drops as a response to positive changes in
economic leverage. Since the demand curve can exhibit a non-monotonic behavior as
pointed out in Kurlat (2013), I focus in equilibrium outcomes from the state-space
that satisfy Dp < 0 and Dκ > 0.
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Proposition 3. Prices and Leverage are procyclical.
Proof. See appendix (2.A).
The formal proof is presented in the appendix. Here, I present a more intuitive
narrative on how asset prices and leverage are procyclical. Assume that the economy






and the economy transitions from
the state A0 to the state A1, with A1 > A2. The increase in productivity has a direct
effect in the return from capital rents rt. As rt increases, the resources available to
finance capital purchases augment as shown in equation (2.12).
The demand for assets shifts to the right as presented in the first panel of
figure (2.1). On impact, asset prices increase and shift from point A to point B in
figure (2.4). As stated in lemma 4, the properties of exponential distributions allow
me to express leverage as a lineal function of asset prices. Thus, the higher level
of asset prices boosts the level of leverage in the economy, as it is reflected in the
second graph of figure (2.1).
This variation in leverage triggers and additional round of movements in the
supply and demand curves. In response, the demand for assets shifts to the right,
as the liquidity provided by assets pledged as collateral increase. On the contrary,
the supply curve shifts to the left as the opportunity cost of selling assets augments.
Thus, the combination of these two effects pushes the economy to a new equilibrium






with p1 > p0, κ1 > κ0 and as previously stated A1 > A0; in other words, the economy
now exhibit higher levels of leverage and asset prices.
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This feature of the model overcomes the important limitations of models with
borrowing constraints. In general, leverage deteriorates in bad times as it has been
highlighted in the literature of leverage cycles coined by Geanakoplos (2009). No-
tice that in models with borrowing constraints, leverage is either a fixed parameter
(Monacelli, 2009) or the product of exogenous stochastic shocks (Bianchi and Men-
doza, 2013). In both cases, these models deliver counterfactual predictions on the
behavior of loan-to-value ratios, as they are assumed to be either acyclical or driven
by exogenous conditions not necessarily tied to the economic cycle.
Proposition 4. (Liquidity Spiral) A negative liquidity shock ζt leads to lower lever-
age and lower asset prices.







and the economy transitions from the state ζ0 to the state ζ1,
with ζ0 > ζ1, a negative liquidity shock. As a consequence of the shock, the leverage
function shifts down, and for each given p, the leverage is lower in the economy
as depicted in figure (2.3). The drop in leverage reduces the opportunity costs of
selling assets and increase the liquidity requirements of entrepreneurs shifting up
the supply for assets; this, as entrepreneur attempt to compensate the decline in
funding liquidity with market liquidity. On the contrary, as the funding liquidity
drops, the recourses to finance capital purchases are lower. This leads to a decline
in the demand for assets stemming from capital purchasers as presented in the first
graph of figure (2.3).
Both, the expansion of supply and the contraction in demand for assets imply
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Fig. 2.1: Leverage and Asset Prices Procyclicality







































Notes.. The distribution of capital units is assumed exponential and the distribution of entrepreneurs technology is
assumed to be log-normal.
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Fig. 2.2: Leverage and Asset Prices Procyclicality (Detailed)















Notes.. The distribution of capital units is assumed exponential and the distribution of entrepreneurs technology is
assumed to be log-normal.
that asset prices plummet. As prices drop, the initial decline in leverage is rein-
forced and triggera a new round of demand and supply shifts. Thus, the economy







is characterized by p1 < p0, κ1 < κ0 and ζ1 < ζ0. In
conclusion, a negative liquidity shock brings about a drop in asset prices, which
reinforces the initial drop in leverage creating a liquidity spiral.
This feature of the model overcomes the counterfactual prediction stemming
from models with liquidity shocks as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Shi (2015).
These models predict a stock market boom following an adverse liquidity shock to
the underlying asset. My model is able to overcome this feature by focusing in shocks
to the opportunity cost of selling assets, instead of focusing on implicit restrictions
on the amount of asset which can be supplied in the economy.
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Fig. 2.3: Liquidity Shocks























Notes.. The distribution of capital units is assumed exponential and the distribution of entrepreneurs technology is
assumed to be log-normal.
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Fig. 2.4: Liquidity Shocks (Detailed)












Notes.. The distribution of capital units is assumed exponential and the distribution of entrepreneurs technology is
assumed to be log-normal.
In summary, this simple model is able to capture two salient features of the
data which have been difficult to reconcile with existing models: the procyclicality
of leverage and asset prices, and the decline of assets prices after a negative liquidity
shock.
4 Final Remarks
This chapter explores the effects of asymmetric information about asset quality when
agents cannot only trade assets to finance investment projects but also use these as-
sets as collateral. Informational asymmetries creates an endogenous wedge between
the ex-ante value of capital pledged by entrepreneurs and the ex-post value of capi-
tal available for resale by intermediaries in case of default. This wedge constitutes
the leverage of the economy. This leverage is endogenous, as asset prices shape the
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quality of capital used in the market as collateral. In addition, asset prices are not
longer determined exclusively by fundamentals but also for the value of the asset as
a liquidity provider. In this context, asset prices and leverage are procyclical and
negatively affected by liquidity shocks.
This chapter can be benefited by incorporating general equilibrium effects. In
particular the effects of interest rates and how the endogenous response of inter-
est rates to negative liquidity shocks can dampen or amplify the initial response




Lemma 1. Optimality conditions for a θ− entrepreneur are characterized by: a) a
productivity threshold θb := δ
b
pt
such that for any realization of θ < θb the entrepreneur





such that for any given realization of productivity θ all qualities below εb are sold.
Proof. Combining equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), we can redefine the con-


























From equation (A.1), decisions for kpt and ι(ε) only affect the right hand side
of the individual resource constraint. Therefore, taking as given the solution for ct
and kt+1, it is possible to solve for capital purchases and qualities of capital sold.
Part (a) from lemma (1) is a direct implication of linearity in kpt . Denote the first
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− pt ≷ 0 (A.2)
Productivity levels θ <
δbt
pt
= θb imply ψ(θ) > 0, so capital purchases are




the value ψ(θ) < 0 and entrepreneurs do not purchase capital (kpt = 0). This last




implies positive investment (xt 6= 0). Thus, when entrepreneurs are capital buyers
they decide not to invest.
The problem of units sold in part (b) requires the function f(·) to be continuous
and differentiable. As the function is homogenous in k we can solve for the case
























∗) ≥ 0 (A.4)
In any interior solution (A.4) holds with equality. So, by ruling out saddle
points in the solution of this problem we can redefine the solution as:
εb ≤ δ−1 (θ (pt − κtq̃t+1)) = δ
−1 (θ/νt) (A.5)
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where δ−1(·) is the inverse of the depreciation function, which exists for all δ(·) bi-
jective functions.
Proposition 1. The supply of assets is monotonically increasing in prices (p) and
monotonically decreasing in leverage (κ).
Proof. As δ(·) is a bijective function, it admits the existence of an inverse func-
tion δ−1(·), such that for δ(·) strictly increasing, its inverse function is also strictly
increasing dδ−1(·) > 0. Notice that for εb = δ−1(θ/νt), the qualities offered are
monotonically increasing in the price level, ∂ε
b
∂p
= dδ−1(·)θ > 0, and monotonically
decreasing in the level of leverage ∂ε
b
∂κ

























> 0 a positive function as shown previously. By the properties of




f(εb) is non-negative. Define a closed interval W ⊂ [θ0, θ1] such that the
aforementioned product is a positive function. As the Riemann integral of a strictly



































f(εb) is non-positive. We can construct a closed interval
W ⊂ [θ0, θ1] such that the function is negative over this interval. Thus, as the Riem-
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Lemma 3. The belief on market depreciation from capital units traded is a time-



















. Proof. This proof is done by guess and verify. In particular, it requires depreciation
beliefs in equation (2.11) to be consistent with the aggregate motion of capital that







t + θxt (A.6)














θxtdG(θ) stands for total aggregate investment. Notice that for any
pt > 0, equilibrium conditions in the capital market require that aggregate capital
purchased must be equal to aggregate capital supplied. Thus, by imposing these





















Notice that by using the definition of Λt presented in equation (2.11) we simplify the


































Kt+1 = δ̄Kt +Xt
Proposition 1. (Leverage) Leverage corresponds to the expected quality of units
used as collateral for all entrepreneurs as defined in equation (2.15).











Proof. Denote the distribution of capital qualities as f t(ε) the truncated dis-
tribution defined over ε ∈ (εb,∞) and using the leverage definition:






Where dG(θ) corresponds to probability density function of entrepreneurs’ quality.
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Lemma 4. For a linear depreciation function δ(ε) and the distributions of qualities
ε following an exponential distributions with mean δ̄, for any given {p}, there exists









Proof. From equation (2.15) it is straightforward to notice that Eθ
(
εb (θ, p, κ∗)
)
=
(p− qκ)θ̄. In addition for a linear δ(·) function, we have dδ(·) is constant and w.l.g































Solving the integral yields 1
λ
which is equivalent to δ̄ = E(ε) for the case of
exponential distributions. Notice, that this expression is linear in κ, thus it admits a









Proposition 3. Prices and Leverage are procyclical
Proof. Define the Excess supply function as e and the implicit leverage function as
l.
e(p, κ, A) = S (p, κ)−D (p, κ, A)
l(p, κ, ζ) = κ− g(p, ζ)


















































Given the conditions presented in Assumption 2, the Jacobian is positive. Now con-




























































= 0 and ∂l
∂κ
= 1. Thus













. Notice that ∂D
∂A
> 0 since ∂D
∂rt
> 0 and in equilibrium
rt = At. Also,
∂l
∂κ
= 1, Thus ∂p
∂A




























































= 0 and ∂l
∂κ
= 1. Thus













. Notice that ∂D
∂A
> 0 since ∂D
∂rt
> 0 and in equilibrium
rt = At. Also,
∂l
∂p
= −g′(p) < 0, Thus ∂κ
∂A
> 0.
Proposition 4. (Liquidity Spiral) A negative liquidity shock ζt leads to lower lever-
age and lower asset prices.




























































This expression can be further simplified since: ∂S
∂ζ
= 0 and ∂D
∂ζ
= 0. Thus un-




















< 0 and ∂l
∂ζ
= −g′(ζ) < 0,
Thus ∂κ
∂ζ





























































This expression can be further simplified since: ∂S
∂ζ
= 0 and ∂D
∂ζ
= 0. Thus un-



























The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. The discount factor for borrowers
is set to β = 0.98 as in Monacelli (2009). The interest rate is set to an annualized
value of 4% R = 1.04. The function determining the quality of capital is assumed
to be lineal and taking the form δ(ε) = ε. In such way the probability density
function follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ = 1/δ̄, where δ̄ =
0.98. Following Ajello (2010) the ability of entrepreneurs to transform consumption
goods into capital follows a log-normal distribution with mean µθ = 0 and standard
deviation σθ = 0.5. This parameter is chosen in order to satisfy the conditions under
Assumption 2. Lower dispersion increases the area in the state-space in which the
demand function is non-monotonic and increasing in asset prices. The mean of the
liquidity shock ζ̄ is set to 0.36 such that the average loan-to-value ratio is close
to 70%. Productivity shocks are discretized using Tauchen with for ρA = 0.95 and
σA = 0.004. Liquidity shocks are discretized by normalizing liquidity series produced
by the Federal Reserve Board and computing an AR(1) process, such that ρζ = 0.89
and σζ = 0.09.
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Chapter 3: Domestic Antidotes to Sudden Stops (with Eduardo Cav-
allo and Alejandro Izquierdo)
1 Introduction
The genesis of a “sudden stop” in capital flows is an abrupt – and oftentimes un-
expected – cut-off of international credit to debtor countries; i.e., a sudden stop in
capital inflows. When foreign creditors stop lending, borrowers have to adjust. Yet,
not everybody in a country that is borrowing from abroad is a debtor vis-à-vis the
rest of the world. In every country, there are agents who borrow and others who
save. In open economies, a portion of the national savings is allocated to purchas-
ing foreign assets (capital outflows). Therefore there are domestic agents who own
foreign assets. Those assets can possibly be repatriated, providing an alternative
source of external financing. If repatriation of assets by residents happens when
foreigners stop lending, then a sudden stop in net capital flows may be averted, or
prevented. This chapter studies under what conditions sudden stops in net capital
flows can be prevented.
The notion of “antidotes to Sudden Stops” or “prevention” in this chapter
takes a specific meaning. It is not removing the risk that foreign lenders may
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abruptly and unexpectedly stop lending. This is usually outside the control of any
given country. Instead, it refers to the conditions under which a sudden stop in gross
capital inflows from foreigners does not become a fully-fledged sudden stop in net
capital flows. Net capital flows to a country is the difference between gross inflows
(lending provided by foreigners) and gross outflows (domestic savings allocated to
purchasing foreign assets). “Prevention” in this chapter is a situation in which,
given a reduction in gross capital inflows of certain magnitude – which we denote
“sudden stop in gross inflows” –, gross capital outflows behave in such a way that
net capital flows remain relatively stable, meaning that net capital flows do not
enter into Sudden Stop mode.
The episodes that are the focus of this chapter can be considered as the se-
quence of two transitions: first, the transition from normal times to periods of
sudden stops in gross inflows. And second, after experiencing a sudden stop in
gross inflows, the transition or not to a net sudden stop. We study the determi-
nants behind each transition taking into account domestic and external factors. Our
empirical results indicate that, while global conditions are important in explaining
the incidence of gross sudden stops, favorable domestic conditions are the antidotes
that matter to understand why these episodes do not become net sudden stops.
As a corollary we find that, in periods of global distress, the ability of a country
to show resilience against capital flight relies heavily on the soundness of domestic
conditions. Considering a comprehensive set of variables, we conclude that episodes
of prevented sudden stops in net capital inflows are positively related to the insti-
tutional background, as well as monetary frameworks with flexible exchange rates
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accompanied by inflation targeting regimes, and negatively related to the country’s
level of foreign liabilities and inflation.
This chapter belongs to a relatively new strand of the sudden stops literature
that considers the distinct roles of gross capital inflows and outflows. Until the
mid-1990s the relative weight of gross capital outflows vis-á-vis gross inflows was
negligible in emerging markets. Therefore, making the distinction between gross
inflows and net capital flows was largely irrelevant. The discussions about capital
flows in emerging markets focused exclusively on “net capital flows” and the po-
tentially disruptive effects their volatility might impose on debtors. As domestic
investors started playing more sizable roles in emerging markets, the discussions
shifted towards differentiating gross capital inflows from outflows.
The distinction between gross and net flows makes it possible to analyze sudden
stop episodes from different perspectives. On the one hand, sudden stops in net
flows can be the consequence of a decline in gross inflows by foreigners; on the
other hand, they can be a consequence of an increase in gross outflows by domestic
agents. In this regard, Cavallo et al. (2013) extend the scope of the term “sudden
stop” to reflect also abrupt changes in gross capital flows. The authors schematize
a taxonomy for sudden stops based on the possibility that a sudden stop in gross
inflows does not translate into a sudden stop in net flows.1 This is possible when
1 They present seven potential sudden stops: a sudden stop in inflows that does not imply a
sudden stop in net flows (SSI); a sudden stop in inflows that translates into a sudden stop in net
flows (SSIN); a sudden stop in net flows that is not a sudden stop in inflows or outflows (SSN); a
sudden stop in inflows and sudden stop in outflows that is not a sudden stop in net flows (SSIO);
a sudden stop in inflows and a sudden surge in outflows that is also a net sudden stop (SSION); a
surge in outflows that is not a sudden stop (SSO); and, a sudden surge in outflows that is a sudden
stop in net flows (SSON).
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domestic residents adjust their asset positions offseting the decline in inflows from
foreigners. They suggest that domestic agents have the ability to prevent episodes
of net sudden stops.
In related work, Broner et al. (2013) find that both gross capital inflows and
outflows increase during economic expansions and decrease during downturns. The
authors also find that in periods of crisis, total gross capital flows collapse due to
the retrenchment of outflows from foreign markets everywhere, and that this phe-
nomenon is particularly stronger if the crisis is global. This is what is behind the
observation that during the global financial crisis of 2008/09, large capital retrench-
ments compensated the fall in gross capital inflows (IMF, 2013).
Our view that global conditions are relevant determinants of episodes of decline
in gross inflows is consistent with the findings of Forbes and Warnock (2012). They
highlight that during the global financial crisis there was an unprecedented num-
ber of countries experiencing both stops and retrenchment episodes simultaneously.
The authors indicate that global factors, especially global risk through changes in
economic uncertainty, as well as changes in risk aversion and global growth, are
key drivers of extreme capital flows episodes such as sudden stops in inflows and
retrenchment of outflows.
It is important from a policy standpoint to know what are the determinants
of prevented sudden stops because sudden stops in net capital flows are significantly
costlier in terms of GDP losses to the affected economies than sudden stops in gross
inflows (Cavallo et al., 2013). This is so because a sudden stop in net capital flows
demands an abrupt adjustment in any outstanding current account deficit, which
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is typically very costly to engineer, particularly in countries with foreign currency
liabilities and low shares of tradable output. Instead, a sudden stop in inflows that
is offset by resident investors, prevents the external adjustment and therefore, the
output costs. Figure 3.1 depicts how the adjustment in output and absorption are
larger for economies that are not able to prevent sudden stops.2 Given that sudden
stops in inflows are largely outside the control of local policymakers, having effective
antidotes to prevent them from becoming full-fledged sudden stops in net capital
flows is welfare enhancing. This chapter sheds light on the role of domestic investors
in increasing the likelihood of prevention conditional on a foreigners’ sudden stop
having materialized and the conditions that characterize this process .
Theoretical Framework. The phenomenon studied in this chapter, i.e.,
the fact that domestic investors may prevent a net sudden stop from occurring,
2 To compute Figure 3.1, we have considered only episodes that were fully prevented during all
quarters; the same applies for episodes that were not prevented. In addition, we only consider non-
overlapping episodes. This clearly reduced the sample size but allows us to get a cleaner picture
of the path of GDP and absorption from prevented and not prevented episodes.
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can be rationalized in terms of two stories or mechanisms about the behavior of
such investors. First, a story of comparative advantage in knowledge. Caballero
and Simsek (2016) provides a theoretical framework to understand how domestic
investors provide a stabilizing counterforce to the “fickleness” in gross inflows due
to their comparative advantage in expertise about local markets. The observed
behavior of capital outflows in periods of distress is consistent with the behavior of
investors who are specialists and have better information about potential projects
in their own country. This assumption aims to capture the attitude of Knightian
agents facing unfamiliar (foreign) situations relating to the work in Dow andWerlang
(1992) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008).
Second, a story of higher investment incentives due to changes in relative
prices. Domestic investors can benefit from changes in exchange rates. Periods
of turmoil are accompanied by sharp currency depreciations that affect positively
the return of investment in local currency, making it more attractive. This idea is
consistent with the findings in Krugman (2000) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2005)
who stated that foreign direct investment actually expands during period of crisis.
But more closely, to the literature that links currency depreciation and investment
incentives such as the theoretical work in Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen
(1997), and the empirical work of Klein and Rosengren (1994) and Goldberg and
Klein (1997).
Related Literature. This chapter is related to Adler et al. (2014). The au-
thors quantify the dynamic impact of global financial shocks on both net and gross
capital flows to emerging markets, and analyze the role played by local investors in
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offsetting the behavior of foreign investors. Making use of a panel vector autore-
gression and the analysis of the resulting impulse responses, they find that, when
facing global uncertainty and shocks to long-term interest rates, local investors can
neutralize the decline in inflows from foreign investors. This chapter differs in some
relevant dimensions from theirs. First, we consider only periods in which sudden
stops occur, i.e. times in which a given country is more vulnerable because of the
reduction in external financing. This permits controlling for any bias stemming from
nonlinearities in the behavior of domestic agents during normal and crisis times. Sec-
ond, the methodology we employ exploits the cross-sectional variation (as oppossed
to only the time series) in capita flows. Countries display heterogenous patterns
in their capital flows dynamics, and the ability of domestic agents to neutralize a
sudden stop in gross flows depends on specific characteristics of their home.
This chapter is also related to Cifuentes and Jara (2014). They stress the
role of assets held abroad and of exchange rate flexibility in shaping the probability
that a retrenchment episode occurs when the economy is facing a sudden stop in
gross inflows. Even though their research question is similar, there are important
differences between the two documents. First, the set of events under study in
both documents do not overlap. This is because, as it will be discussed below, the
occurrence of a retrenchment – defined as an extreme event of capital outflows –
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to prevent a sudden stop in net
flows. Second, our sample includes a broader set of countries and more explanatory
variables, e.g. foreign liabilities, institutional quality and contagion effects. This
allows for a comprehensive analysis of the role of domestic factors in explaining how
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prevention can materialize.
Our chapter is part of the literature on the determinants of sudden stops, i.e.,
Calvo et al. (2004) and Calvo et al. (2008). This literature initially explored the
determinants of the abrupt decline in net flows, particularly in emerging economies,
because back in the 1990s and early 2000s, they were the most vulnerable to these
type of episodes. This chapter is related to the strand of the literature that departs
from the net flow approach, and that studies inflows and outflows separately in
an effort to understand the role that local and foreign investors have in shaping
each of them. This strand of literature includes Calderon and Kubota (2013) and
Forbes and Warnock (2012). The focus on gross rather than net capital flows yields
some interesting facts. For example, Schmidt and Zwick (2013), using data for the
Euro area, conclude that domestic volatility (i.e. uncertainty about the evolution
of the economy and the economic policy implemented) played an important role in
determining the dynamics of gross flows and the increase in home bias observed in
the are during the crisis.
Another examples is Ghosh et al. (2014). The authors postulate that global
factors, such as US interest rates and global risk, are important elements associated
with capital surges in emerging markets. However, the attractiveness of a country
as an investment destination is largely driven by domestic factors. This does not
imply that foreign investors do not react to local conditions. On the contrary, foreign
investors consider local conditions as much as domestic investors do, but they are
more sensitive to changes in global conditions. Fratzscher (2011) finds additional
evidence on the role of global factors driving gross flows during the global financial
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crisis of 2007− 2009 and its aftermath. He finds that the rise in risk was the culprit
of the reallocation of flows from many emerging to some advanced economies during
the crisis. This is in contrast with the pre- and post-crisis periods, in which external
factors had the opposite effect. Domestic factors are instead related to the observed
cross-country heterogeneity in the pattern of capital flows.
The existence of a home bias in capital flows has been also part of the literature.
In particular, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) have pointed out a generalized but
heterogenous collapse in international capital flows during the financial crisis. Along
the same lines, Giannetti and Laeven (2012) show that, during periods of crisis
that involve higher uncertainty, investors become more risk averse and revert to
domestic investments that can be evaluated at lower costs due to lower asymmetric
information. Jochem and Volz (2011) in turn argue that the home bias in the Euro
zone is associated to changes in the portfolio structure in favor of domestic assets
mainly by financial institutions in an effort to deleverage due to the inherent risk in
their balance sheets.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents definitions and deter-
minants of sudden stops. Section 3 provides a brief description of the methodology
and presents the baseline results. Section 4 summarizes the results from the sensi-
tivity and robustness checks. Section 5 studies the conditions under which a country
is able to continue in a path of prevention once it has been able to prevent a sudden
stop episode in a given quarter. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Definitions, Measurement and Data
2.1 Sudden Stops in Capital Flows
In the Balance of Payments (BOP) accounting, gross inflows correspond to the
total liability transactions in the Financial Account (meaning lending from non-
residents). Gross outflows are defined as total asset transactions in the Financial
Account (meaning residents’ purchases of foreign assets). Using quarterly data
on gross capital flows obtained from the Balance of Payment Statistics (BOPS)
developed and reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we denote net
flows of country j in period t as Njt = Ijt + Ojt, where Ijt and Ojt represents
gross inflows and outflows respectively. See Appendix 3.A for further details on the
construction of the capital flows series.
A gross sudden stop in capital inflows is defined as an event in which the year-
on-year change in gross capital inflows falls below two standard deviations from its
historical mean. In terms of measuring its length in time, the sudden stop episode
starts from the moment in which the series falls one standard deviation below its
historical mean, but conditional on the fact that it will eventually cross the two-
standard-deviations threshold. The episode ends when the series goes back to one
standard deviation below the historical mean.
A sudden stop in net capital flows is defined in an analogous way, using net
capital flows, i.e. inflows minus outflows instead of inflows only.
To reduce the effects of seasonality in net and gross capital flow series, we apply
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a moving average filter. In particular, for quarterly series we define Cnjt =
∑3
t=0Njt
and C ijt =
∑3
t=0 Ijt for t = 4, 5, . . . , T . The year-on-year change in net financial
flows is defined as ∆Cxjt = Cjt − Cj,t−4 with x = {n, i}. Therefore, a sudden stop
in net and gross flows can be defined as an episode in which the variable ∆Cxjt falls
below two standard deviations from of its historical mean.
A more detailed description of the series used to compute sudden stops is pre-
sented in Table 3.C.2 in Appendix 3.C. After all the adjustments, we end with a
dataset at quarterly frequency, from 1980 through 2014, which comprises 48 coun-
tries (Appendix 3.B).
2.2 Episodes in the Sample
To get a better understanding of the incidence of capital outflows adjustments in
preventing sudden stops in gross inflows to become net sudden stops. Figure 3.1
displays the dynamics of the smoothed series of capital inflows and outflows changes
for the case of Germany, Thailand and Turkey. The dashed line in the graphs
corresponds to the threshold that defines a sudden stops in gross inflows. More
specifically, when the solid black line falls below the dashed line we define this as a
gross sudden stop.
The panels in the first column denominated prevented, present in shaded blue
area all episodes of sudden stops in gross inflows that were not a sudden stop in
net flows. And the panels in the second column named Not Prevented, present in
shaded grey area all episodes of sudden stops in gross inflows that were a sudden
stops in net flows.
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For the case of Germany presented in the first row of figure 3.1, the changes
in capital flows exhibit a “diamond pattern”. This implies that periods of large
declines in capital inflows have also coincided with the decline in capital outflows
of approximately the same magnitude. These offsetting variations have allowed the
country to build higher resilience and withstand the changes in foreign investors
positions as presented in the blue areas; with the exception of the episode in 2013
(shown in the second column), Germany has been able to prevent the occurrence of
a net sudden stop.
The contrasting view is presented in the cases of Thailand and Turkey. Flows
in Thailand do not display the “diamond pattern”, particularly in the episodes after
1994. Very few episodes in the last 20 years were prevented as shown in the second
column; in some cases it was because because the variations in outflows were not
enough to compensate the fall in inflows. Turkey presents a radical scenario as
all the sudden stops in gross inflows were also sudden stops in net flows. This is
evident as the variation in capital inflows displays a relatively higher volatility, when
compared to the volatility in capital outflows. In this particular case, the behavior
of domestic agents appears to be not enough to compensate the variation in inflows.
Table 3.1 summarizes gross and net sudden stops in terms of the number of
episodes, their average duration and the total number of quarters in which countries
have experienced these events in the sample. There are a total of 1,274 quarters
that we identify as sudden stops in gross inflows – SSI – out of a total of 10,736
quarters in the dataset. This corresponds to 341 unique SSI episodes with an average
duration of 3.74 quarters. Out of the 1,274 quarters that qualify as sudden stops in
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Source Author’s own calculations based on data from IMF-IFS. Grey shaded areas indicate episodes
which are catalogued as sudden stops in capital inflows that also are net sudden stops, i.e., not
prevented. Blue shaded areas indicate episodes which are catalogued as sudden stops in capital
inflows that are not net sudden stops, i.e., prevented.
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gross inflows in the sample, 686 quarters are contemporaneously identified as sudden
stops in net capital flows, while 588 quarters are not. The latter are “prevented”
episodes, while the former are not.
An analysis of the data indicates that not all sudden stops in gross inflows
become sudden stops in net flows, suggesting that capital outflows have an important
role in preventing the occurrence of net sudden stops. By comparing columns (3)
and (8) it is observed that around 46 percent of total potential net sudden stops
periods are prevented. This proportion is even bigger if we only consider advanced
economies, in which case around 63 percent of total gross sudden stop in inflows
periods are not sudden stops in net flows. However, the fraction of prevented periods
diminishes if we focus on emerging and frontier economies.3 In these groups of
countries, the fraction of prevented periods decreases considerably, to 32 and 17
percent, respectively.
Importantly, prevented sudden stops are not exclusively related with an ex-
treme decrease in gross capital outflows (or retrenchments).4 In other words, ex-
treme events of capital outflows are neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid sudden
stops in net flows. On the one hand, they are not sufficient: columns (6) and (7) in
Table 3.1 show that 17 percent of total net sudden stop periods were accompanied by
retrenchments; this percentage is around 22 percent for emerging economies. This
suggests that even a very large repatriation of assets may not suffice to prevent a
fall in net flows. This is likely to be the case when the underlying decline in gross
3 For a detailed description on country classification, see Appendix 3.B.
4 (Forbes and Warnock, 2012) define retrenchments as the mirror image sudden stops, i.e.,
episodes when there is decline in gross capital outflows that exceed two standard deviations of the
sample mean.
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inflows is very large, for example three or four standard deviations.
On the other hand, retrenchments are not necessary: columns (8) and (9)
in Table 3.1 shows that 22 percent of the total periods of prevented sudden stops
were not accompanied by periods of retrenchment in capital outflows. In the case
of emerging economies this fraction is around 34 percent, which rises to 38 percent
and 53 percent for emerging economies in Latin America and Eastern Europe, re-
spectively.5 This suggests that even a small repatriation of capital outflows may
suffice to prevent a sudden stop in net capital flows.
Another fact is that quarters with prevention and quarters without prevention
can coexists within the window of a single sudden stop in gross inflows. Therefore,
we distinguish between “purely” and “partially” prevented episodes. “Purely” pre-
vented are episodes when a net sudden stop is avoided during the entire duration
of the SSI episode. Meanwhile, “partially” prevented episodes are those when a net
sudden stop occurs during at least one quarter of a SSI episode.
Figure 3.2 plots sudden stops in gross capital inflows by duration (in quarters)
on the x-axis, against the number of quarters during which prevention was effectively
achieved (y-axis). For example, there are 18 sudden stop epsiodes in gross inflows
that lasted one quarter, 30 episodes that lasted 2 quarters, 37 episodes that lasted
3 quarters, and so on up to the 3 episodes that lasted 10 consecutive quarters (the
longest duration for sudden stops in gross inflows in the database). These add
up to the 1,274 quarters that we identify as SSI. For the 18 SSI episodes with
5 In fact as described in section (4.2) episodes of retrenchment and prevented sudden stops are
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Source Author’s own calculations based on data from IMF-IFS. Episodes along the diagonal are
“purely prevented” sudden stops, while the rest are “partially prevented” episodes.
duration 1 quarter that were prevented, the prevention is complete; i.e., they are
all “purely” prevented. Of the 30 SSI episodes with duration 2 quarters, 25 were
“purely” prevented, and 5 were prevented during only 1 quarter. We denote the
latter as “partially” prevented. Of the 37 SSI episodes that lasted 3 quarters, 27
were “purely” prevented, 5 were “partially” prevented during 2 quarters, and 5 were
“partially” prevented during 1 quarter only. Therefore, the episodes that align over
the 45-degree line are the “purely” prevented episodes, while all the episodes below
the 45-degree line are “partially” prevented.
The pattern that emerges from the chart is that, as the underlying SSI has
longer duration, it is less likely that full prevention will prevail. In fact, none of the
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8 SSI episodes in the sample that lasted 9 or 10 quarters were “purely” prevented.
The distinction between “purely” and “partially” prevented episodes is of in-
terest from an analytical standpoint. While focusing on “purely” prevented episodes
can help to pin down the factors that can be useful to successfully fend-off sudden
stops, the analysis of “partially” prevented episodes is useful to evaluate the factors
that determine the length of survival. We apply different methodologies to answer
two different questions.
The first question is: what are the factors that determine “prevention”? To
answer this question we focus on “purely” prevented episodes only. In order to study
the factors that help prevent sudden stops in gross inflows becoming fully-fledged
sudden stops in net flows, we use an estimation strategy that exploits the sequential
nature of the problem. The problem can be decomposed in two stages. First, the
economy either experiences a sudden stop in gross inflows or it does not. If it does,
then it can transition either into a prevented sudden stop or into a sudden stop in
net flows. Therefore, the transition into a prevented sudden stop can only occur
after the economy has experienced a sudden stop in gross inflows, and this should
be taken into account at the time of estimation. Given the sequential nature of the
problem, we resort to the sequential logit model, which entails the estimation of
separate logit regressions for each step of the problem, restricting the sample only
to those countries “at risk” of making the transition. In other words, in the first
stage, which we denote as “inflows”, we estimate a logit using the full sample, while
in the second stage, that we call “prevented”, we restrict the sample only to those
countries that in the previous stage experienced a sudden stop in gross inflows. The
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identification assumption is that, besides the temporal precedence, the decision in
the first stage is independent from the one in the second stage, and this is the reason
why it is valid to run separate regressions for each transition.
The second question is: what are the factors that prolong spells of prevention
after a sudden stop in inflows has materialized? To answer this question we focus
on “partially” prevented episodes, i.e., episodes of sudden stop in inflows that were
prevented during some, but not all, the quarters. In this context, we consider
two types of “partially” prevented episodes, which involve two types of transitions.
Denote a prevented sudden stop in a given quarter as PSS. Denote a net sudden stop
in a given quarter, i.e. a sudden stop in inflows that is not prevented, as NSS. Then,
a “failed prevention” corresponds to the transition PSS → NSS. Then, by means
of duration models, we study the determinants of the hazard rate of transitioning
to a NSS, conditional on being in a PSS for a certain period of time.
2.3 Determinants of Sudden Stops
To define the set of determinants of sudden stops (gross and prevented) to be used in
the econometric exercise, we have taken into account all the explanatory variables
that have been considered in the empirical literature analyzing net sudden stops
(Calvo et al., 2008), gross sudden stops (Calderon and Kubota, 2013; Alberola
et al., 2012), currency crisis (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin,
1998), current account reversals (Edwards, 2007) and retrenchments (Forbes and
Warnock, 2012). We define a set of baseline explanatory variables to be used in the
benchmark regressions, and then we consider additional variables for the sensitivity
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analysis. In all cases we distinguish between global and domestic determinants. All
the data is at the quarterly frequency, unless otherwise stated. A brief description of
each variable is provided below; for further details refer to Table 3.C.1 in Appendix
3.C.
Baseline regressors
Regarding the global factors, we consider four variables: global risk, global
liquidity growth, global interest rates and global growth. We proxy global risk
by the US stock market volatility, measured as the VXO – the implied volatility
index calculated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange – for the period 1986 −
2014, extended back to 1980 based on Bloom (2009). Growth in global liquidity
is quantified by the yearly growth rate of global money supply; this measure is
computed as the average of the growth rate of M2 in the United States, Eurozone
and Japan and the growth rate of M4 for the UK. Global interest rates are calculated
as the average of the interest rates on long-term government bonds in the United
States, core Euro Area and Japan. And finally, global growth corresponds to the
year-on-year growth rate in the World’s real GDP. The source of the last three
variables is International Financial Statistics (IFS) from IMF.
We use a more comprehensive set of domestic factors relative to those con-
sidered in previous literature. The data series were obtained mostly from IFS –
complemented with Datastream and local sources whenever not available –, unless
otherwise stated.
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Economic performance is measured by the year-on-year growth rate of real
GDP. Better economic perfrormance can enhance the resilience of emerging markets
to the vulnerabilities associated to sudden stop episodes. A proxy for soundness of
the macroeconomic policy in the baseline is average CPI inflation. We also include
a measure of bank credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP, obtained from
Beck et al. (2009).6 In addition, we introduce a measure of the degree of domestic
liability dollarization (which (Calvo et al., 2008) show is a significant determinant
of sudden stops), defined as bank foreign borrowing – from IFS and Bank of Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) – as a share of GDP. As a proxy of trade openess which
has been shown to be a determinant of sudden stops in Cavallo and Frankel (2008)
we use the ratio of real exports plus imports to GDP. Following Calvo et al. (2008),
we also include the current account deficit as a share of the absorption of tradable
goods. The absorption of tradable goods is computed as imports plus tradable out-
put domestically consumed. The latter is calculated as the sum of agricultural and
industrial output – obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) con-
structed by the World Bank – minus exports. Contagion episodes are accounted
for by including a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country reports a
sudden stop in gross inflows in t and there is one large trading partner that suffered
a sudden stop in t− 1.
The innovation of this chapter, in terms of the determinants of sudden stops
considered, is to include a variable that accounts for each country’s institutional
6 Alternative measures considered are: our own measure of private credit to GDP constructed
based on IFS data, credit to the private sector by financial institutions as percentage of total
deposits in financial institutions also constructed from IFS data, and bank credit to the private
sector as a percentage of total deposits in banks obtained from Beck et al. (2009).
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background. As a proxy we use of the composite risk rating index produced by
the Political Risk Services Group. This index is composed of 12 components: gov-
ernment stability, socio-economic conditions, investment-profile, internal conflict,
external conflict, corruption, military and politics, religious tensions, law and order,
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucracy quality. Since the in-
dividual indexes are also reported, we not only consider the overall index but also
construct our own sub-index just with the categories that are relevant for this study:
rule of law, investment profile, government stability, bureaucracy quality, and cor-
ruption. The last measure is the one used in the baseline regression, and the overall
index, denoted as ‘Political Risk’ is considered for the robustness analysis.
We also consider the exchange rate regime. Exchange rate flexibility is mea-
sured by the fine classification of exchange rate regimes constructed by Reinhart
and Rogoff (2004) and updated by Iltzezky et al. (2009); higher values of this in-
dicator is associated to a more flexible exchange rate regime. However the analysis
of exchange rate in isolation can be misleading. In fact, the consolidation of macro
policies enhancing exchange rate flexibility have been accompanied by inflation tar-
geting as the monetary anchor. To account for this, we add as additional regressors
a dummy variable (IT) that takes the value of 1 if the country has adopted inflation
targeting and the interaction between the two variables.
A more detailed description of the series used to compute sudden stops and
the variables involved in the regressions are presented in Table 3.C.2 in Appendix
3.C.
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3 Purely Prevented Sudden Stops
We construct a comprehensive dataset at quarterly frequency, from 1980 through
2014, which comprises in the baseline scenario 48 countries and includes all the
variables detailed in the previous section.
3.1 Methodology
In order to study the factors that help to prevent gross sudden stops becoming fully-
fledged net sudden stops, we use an estimation strategy that exploits the sequential
nature of the problem. The problem addressed in this chapter can be decomposed
in two stages. First, the economy either experiences a sudden stop in gross inflows
or it does not. If it does, then it can transition towards either a prevented sudden
stop or a sudden stop in net flows. Therefore, the transition towards a prevented
sudden stop only occurs after the economy has experienced a sudden stop in gross
inflows, and this should be taken into account at the time of estimation.
We resort to the sequential logit model, initially proposed by Mare (1981) to
describe the process of educational attainment and then applied to many other
problems in the orbit of empirical microeconomics. The sequential logit model
entails the estimation of separate logit regressions for each step, restricting the
sample only to those countries “at risk” of making the transition. In other words, in
the first stage, that we denote as “inflows”, we estimate a logit with the full sample
of countries, while in the second state, that we call “purely prevented”, we restrict
the sample only to those countries that in the previous stage experienced a sudden
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stop in gross inflows.
As stated previously, we are interested in determining the conditions under
which a sudden stop episode is purely prevented; for this purpose, we estimate the
following model:
Prob(eit = 1) = G
(





where eit is an episode that takes the value of 1 if country i in quarter t is experiencing
a sudden stop in gross inflows that is not a net sudden and The assumption made in
this model is that, beside the temporal precedence, the decision in the first stage is
independent from the one in the second stage, and this is the reason why it is valid
to run separate regressions for each transition.
3.2 Baseline Results
Following Forbes and Warnock (2012), all the explanatory variables are lagged one
period (quarter), except when stated otherwise. Many of the series are exposed to
extreme outliers (observations which are 3 times higher (lower) than the interquan-
tile range at the 75% (25%) percentile). We include interaction terms with dummies
that capture extremes values as controls for outliers without to avoid sacrificing the
number of observations available.
The main results are presented in Table 3.1. Column (1) presents the results for
sudden stops in gross inflows; it shows that global conditions, in particular, global
risk and economic growth, are significant predicting the transition of economies
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towards periods of sudden stop in gross inflows. On the one hand, higher global
volatility make countries more prone to experience sudden stops in gross inflows; on
the other hand, periods of high economic growth reduce the incidence of such type
of episodes.
In addition, the incidence of sudden stops in inflows are also associated with
domestic conditions. In particular, higher levels of foreign liabilities and private
credit, or the exposure of trading partner to a sudden stop increase countries’ vul-
nerability to stops in gross inflows; while economic growth reduces this vulnerability.
Once the economy has experienced a sudden stop in gross inflows, then it can
transition either to a net sudden stop or not. Column (2) in Table 3.1 shows that
global conditions do not influence the likelihood of preventing or not a net sudden
stop; only domestic characteristics can provide the antidotes for prevention: lower
levels of foreign liabilities in the banking system (consistent with the findings in
Calvo et al. (2008)) lower levels of inflation and a better institutional background
shield the economy to avoid likelihood a purely prevented sudden stop.
In addition, we find that the degree of exchange rate flexibility (FER) is not
relevant in explaining neither the transitions to sudden stops in gross or net flows.7
However, higher flexibility can increase the resilience to a sudden stop in net inflows
if it also involves a de-jure commitment to stabilize the price level in the economy.
By shifting the focus to non-advanced economies which have historically more
prone to experience these episodes, we find that the results in the baseline scenario
7 This result is robust to the use of course classification in Iltzezky et al. (2009) or differences
with respect to mean as in Cifuentes and Jara (2014) (results not tabulated).
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remain unaffected. In addition to global volatility and growth, these economies are
more likely to face a sudden stops in gross inflows in periods of high liquidity growth
and low global interest rates as reported in column (3). But these conditions do
not have any incidence in the ability of non-advanced countries to prevent a sudden
stop as shown in column (4). For these economies lower foreign liabilities and a
higher flexible exchange rate accompanied by inflation targets reduce the incidence.
In addition, the combination of higher economic growth, openness and low levels of
private credit by banks are additional antidotes to net sudden stops.
Finally, in Columns (5) and (6) we report the results from excluding outliers
present in the sample. There are no substantial differences in the results from a
direct modelling approach (Columns (1) and (2)) with respect to the alternative of
excluding all extreme observations.
4 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct an extensive series of robustness and sensitivity tests including ad-
ditional control variables, alternative measures of the variables presented in the
baseline regression and different definitions of sudden stops.
4.1 Alternative Measures for Variables in the Baseline Regression
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.2 the lag structure of the domestic variables is set
to 4 periods instead of 1. Introducing the fourth lag helps us to reduce the incidence
that periods of crisis entail over macroeconomic variables. The results obtained in
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the baseline remained unaffected, thus, the idea that foreign liabilities, inflation
rate, institutions and flexible exchanges rates coined with inflation targeting are not
driven by the lag choice of the baseline model.
The rise of private credit is an important deterrent in the ability of prevention
in non-advanced economies as presented in previous section. Thus, we assess the
relevance over the whole of sample of alternative measures of credit conditions in
the economy. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.2, we replace our measure of private
credit by banks as a percentage of GDP developed by Beck et al. (2009)) by total
bank credit as percentage of deposits, without finding important variations with
respect to the baseline. Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we introduce a broader
measure of credit (total credit as % of GDP), but did not find any differences in the
results. Credit in the economy is relevant to understand episodes of sudden stops
in gross inflows, but not relevant in the overall sample, to prevent these episode in
becoming net sudden stops.
As the measure of institutional quality is relevant in several of our regressions
to reduce the probability of a net sudden stops. We evaluate the significance of
this variable by introducing the overall index of political risk produced by the Po-
litical Risk Services Group, and not just specific subcomponents as in the baseline
regression. The results reported in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3.2 are robust to
the inclusion of this alternative measure of institutions and are not quantitatively
different from our baseline results.
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4.2 Alternative Definition of Episodes
Bonanza-Related Episodes
We assess in this section the validity of our results in light of alternative definitions
of sudden stops, that account for potential mitigating or reinforcing triggers. We
introduce an extension to the standard definition of sudden stops: bonanza-filtered
sudden stops. Although this definition may not be totally comparable with the ones
used in our baseline regression, it sheds light on the relevance of specific country
factors depending on whether the economy is going through periods of distress or
not.
Bonanza-filtered sudden stops capture the feature that favorable terms of trade
shocks can add sources of financing directly from the current account, without the
need of resorting in domestic agents to offset the contraction in capital inflows. We
construct bonanza episodes similarly to episodes of extreme flows variations. Thus,
a bonanza is defined as a terms of trade window, i.e., a dummy variable that takes de
value 1 if the seasonally adjusted terms of trade rise beyond two standard deviations
from their historical mean. The length of bonanza episodes is determined from the
moment in which the series increases one standard deviation above its historical
mean to the moment in which returns to be within the one standard deviation
threshold.
An improvement in the terms of trade can reduce the reliance on the compen-
sating behavior in domestic agents after the disruption of capital flows. Thus, we
evaluate how sudden stops are more likely to be prevented in absence of a funding
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mechanism stemming directly from the current account. Columns (1) to (2) in Ta-
ble 3.3 depict the results when bonanza episodes are excluded. The results are very
similar to those presented in the baseline scenario. However, in absence of favorable
terms of trade, economic growth surges as an additional important domestic factor
to increase the likelihood of prevention.
Preventable Episodes
The ability of a country to prevent a sudden stop can be influenced by the size of
its assets available; in other words, if existing assets are enough to offset the change
in capital inflows. These assets can be the result of either capital repatriation or
simply a reduction in planned outgoing flows; unfortunately given data availabil-
ity is impossible to disentangle the origin of outflows; in particular, the fraction
corresponding to the reduction of investment abroad from domestic investors.
Based on these restriction we can only proxy this capacity to respond in mag-
nitude to a sudden stop in net inflows, making use of the existing stock of assets
abroad. We test the baseline results, excluding episodes in which the ratio between
the stock of assets (during previous quarter) and the change in capital inflows during
a sudden stop is two standard deviations below its historical mean.8
Results are presented in columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.3. There is no sig-
nificant variation compared with our baseline scenario. However, it is important at
this point to acknowledge the difficulty in measuring a country’s ability to prevent
a sudden stop by using their current stock of assets.
8 This measure accounts for the possibility that not all assets are susceptible to repatriation.
The results reported in this section are robust to the period in which assets are measured.
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Domestic Private Agents
Hitherto, the analysis has considered both private and public outflows and their role
in offsetting changes in capital inflows. In this section we specifically address how
private agents can mitigate the incidence of a sudden stop. For that purpose, we
construct a series of capital outflows considering only private flows and reconstruct
the episodes of net sudden stops based on this newly created series.9 Column (5) in
Table 3.3 presents the results of the second transition when only private assets are
considered. The results from our baseline framework are also consistent even when
we exclude the public sector, although foreign liabilities are not longer an important
driver of prevention. Domestic private investors are more responsive to domestic
conditions on the verge of a sudden stop in capital inflows, and this responsiveness
is tied to lower levels of inflation and credit and better institutional quality and
flexible exchange rates accompanied by inflation targeting schemes.
Sudden Stops and Retrenchments
Finally, we study the determinants of episodes of sudden stops in net inflows that
are accompanied by retrenchments in net outflows. Notice that as stated previously
capital retrenchments are neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent a net sudden
stops. In fact, the results reported in column (6) of Table 3.3 suggest that prevented
sudden stops and retrenchments are driven to some extent by different domestic
conditions. The simultaneity of a sudden stop and a retrenchment appear to be
9 For a detailed description on how private flows are constructed, please refer to appendix 3.A
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more likely to occur when the sudden stops are systemic, in the sense that it also
affects a country’s trading partners and by the growth in private credit. Since the
resilience of a country to a sudden stop builds upon the capacity of domestic agents
to offset the fall in foreign inflows, it is necessary to understand the distinction
between retrenchment and prevented episodes and the conditions driving each one
of these episodes.
5 Partially Prevented Sudden Stops: Failed Preventions
As discussed previously, not all quarters during one given episode are prevented.
In some cases, the ability of a country to withstand the impact of sudden stop
in gross inflows can be limited. In this section we focus on “partially” prevented
episodes, in particular on “failed preventions”. Denote a prevented sudden stop in
a given quarter as PSS, and a net sudden stop in a given quarter as NSS. Then, a
“failed prevention” corresponds to the transition PSS → NSS. In other words, we
explore once a country has been able to prevent a net sudden stop, what conditions
are necessary for this country to continue in a path of prevention as quarters in a
sudden stop in inflows progress.
5.1 Methodology
In order to understand the determinant of “failed preventions”, we conduct a du-
ration analysis to estimate the effect of different external and domestic factors on
the hazard rate of failed transitions. For a “failed prevention”, we consider as fail-
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ure/death to experiencing a NSS once the country has been in a period of PSS; in
other words, we consider the survival of a country as its ability to avoid having a
net sudden stops.
Notice that as multiple transitions between PSS and NSS can occur in different
quarters of the same episode, we focus exclusively on the information condensed in
the first transitions.
The baseline estimation is performed using the Cox regression model, however
we consider alternative scenarios including parametric distributions for the baseline
hazard. The Cox proportional-hazard model is a semi-parametric method that en-
ables to determine the effect of different variables on the hazard rate. Assuming
that there are n episodes of sudden stop in inflows, then the model has the form:
λi (t) = e
X′iβ · λ0 (t) , i = 1, . . . , n
where Xi is the vector of regressors, β is the vector of regression coefficients, λi
is the hazard calculated for each episode and λ0 is the baseline hazard. The baseline
hazard function corresponds, in this case, to the probability of transitioning to a
different state (PSS → NSS) when all the explanatory variables are 0. It should
be noted that, in a proportional hazard model, the unique effect of a unit increase
in a covariate is assumed to be multiplicative with respect to the hazard rate.
Estimates are obtained using clustered standard errors at the country level to
account for the fact that for each country there can be multiple unordered failure
events of the same type. The Efron’s method is used to handle ties.
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5.2 Results
Table 3.4 reports the results for this exercise. Column (1) presents the baseline
results for the Cox Model. Notice that external factors do not affect the probability
of experiencing a net sudden stop given that the country has prevented it for a given
number of quarters. This result is not surprising since we have already documented
that, while important for explaining the transition from a situation with no sudden
stop to a sudden stop in inflows, external conditions do not seem to matter to
explain the prevention of a net sudden stop. The factors that increase the hazard of
transitioning to a net sudden stop given that it was prevented for a while are higher
levels of foreign liabilities and the absence of exchange rate flexibility accompanied
by price stability.
These results are robust to alternative assumptions on the shape of the baseline
hazard. Columns (2)-(4) show the results when we consider parametric functional
forms for the baseline hazard: Weibull, Exponential and Gompertz. We do not
only find that foreign liabilities and exchange rate flexibility are important but also
that lower levels of inflation increase the hazard of surviving. In column (5), we
isolate the potential effect of left-censoring in the estimation.10 We exclude from
the database all countries who experience a net sudden stop in the first quarter
of a sudden stop in gross inflows. Under this characterization of the dataset, we
find that foreign liabilities, inflation and exchange rate flexibility are important to
10 The left censoring occurs when the observed outcome of a country during a period of sudden
stop in inflows is NSS. It can be as result of the inability of a country to prevent a net sudden stop
at the origin; or it can be the result of the discrete nature of the data.
139
understand the differences in the hazard of survival. Finally, in column (6) we report
the results after stratifying the baseline hazard for emerging economies; however all
main results are unaffected.
6 Final Remarks
The global financial crisis of 2008/09 demonstrated that few countries are exempt
from the risk of a foreigners’ sudden stop (i.e., a sharp contraction in gross capital
inflows). However, it also showed that some countries were more successful prevent-
ing that a fall in gross capital inflows turned into a sudden stop in net capital flows.
This is important because countries that can avoid sudden stops in net capital flows
in the aftermath of a foreigners’ sudden stop, can also avoid the large output contrac-
tions and the concomitant banking and financial crises that are usually associated
with those episodes.
Why are some countries more resilient than others? More specifically, what are
the “antidotes” that enable some countries that are affected by foreigners’ sudden
stops to prevent them from becoming fully-fledged sudden stops in net capital flows?
The answer provided in this chapter is that the antidotes are mostly domestic factors.
Keeping low levels of liability dollarization, having a strong institutional background,
keeping inflation at check, and having flexible exchange rates in the context of
credible monetary anchors, are the factors that help to increase the likelihood of
preventing a sudden stop in net capital flows during a foreigners’ sudden stop.
The methodology employed in this chapter exploits the sequential nature of
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the sudden stop problem: first countries may or may not experience a foreigners’
sudden stop. Second, those that experience a foreigners’ sudden stop can prevent it
from becoming a sudden stop in net capital flows, or not. This sequencing in turn
differentiates this chapter from previous attempts that have focused on the empirical
determinants of episodes of sudden stops in gross capital inflows and retrenchments
in gross capital outflows. We show that the determinants of prevented sudden stops
in our sample are different from the determinants of episodes of sudden stops in
inflows that happen simultaneously with retrenchment in capital outflows.
In addition, the methodology employed in this chapter permits disentangling
between “purely prevented” sudden stops, and “partially prevented” sudden stops.
The former are episodes that are prevented during the entire window of the under-
lying foreigners’ sudden stop, while the latter are prevented only during part of the
foreigners’ episode. A duration analysis performed using the set of partially pre-
vented episodes suggests that keeping low levels of liability dollarization and having
flexible exchange rates combined with an inflationary targeting monetary regime,
are the main factors that help to prolong survival (i.e., avoid a sudden stop in net
capital flows) during a foreigners’ sudden stop.
The main message of this chapter is that while it may not be possible for
countries to insulate themselves from the volatility of gross capital inflows, the anti-
dotes to prevent that volatility from forcing potentially costly external adjustments
is in their own hands. In doing so, the role of domestic investors is critical. This is
so because sudden stops in net capital flows can be prevented when the actions of
domestic investors offset a reduction in foreign lending. It is only under favorable
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domestic conditions that domestic investors may perceive reduced risk in bringing
in resources at the time of an external shock, thus insulating the country from the
original shock.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global Conditions
Risk 0.033*** -0.014 0.027** 0.059 0.043*** -0.041
(lagged) (0.009) (0.027) (0.013) (0.084) (0.010) (0.029)
Liquidity Growth 0.005* 0.007 0.013*** -0.025 0.002 0.013
(lagged) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.027) (0.003) (0.012)
Growth -0.312*** -0.104 -0.252** 0.106 -0.335*** -0.081
(lagged) (0.075) (0.118) (0.119) (0.262) (0.096) (0.137)
Interest Rates -0.040 -0.065 -0.313*** 0.182 -0.018 -0.188
(lagged) (0.046) (0.131) (0.120) (1.189) (0.048) (0.130)
Domestic Conditions
Foreign Liabilities 0.029*** -0.067** 0.050*** -0.260** 0.038*** -0.065**
(lagged, % GDP) (0.008) (0.031) (0.014) (0.115) (0.010) (0.031)
CA/TA -0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004
(lagged) (0.004) (0.013) (0.006) (0.038) (0.004) (0.015)
GDP growth -0.117*** 0.068 -0.126*** 0.201* -0.096*** 0.037
(lagged) (0.026) (0.055) (0.040) (0.108) (0.033) (0.062)
Inflation 0.015 -0.252*** 0.006 -0.156 -0.019 -0.245**
(lagged) (0.025) (0.084) (0.025) (0.122) (0.028) (0.096)
Openness -0.001 0.014* -0.001 0.051*** -0.001 0.012
(lagged) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.009)
Private credit by banks 0.006*** -0.005 0.006 -0.056*** 0.007*** -0.005
(% of GDP, BDK) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.002) (0.007)
Institutions -0.000 0.048** 0.002 -0.047 -0.008 0.052**
(0.008) (0.020) (0.012) (0.080) (0.009) (0.021)
Contagion 0.723*** 0.415 0.283 -1.102 0.736*** 0.490
(lagged, land borders) (0.166) (0.436) (0.191) (0.802) (0.181) (0.479)
Flexible Exchange Rate (FER) -0.169 -0.151 -0.144 3.092 -0.243 -0.827
(0.176) (0.626) (0.350) (2.042) (0.194) (0.793)
Inflation Targeting (IT) -0.801* -2.485* -0.518 -14.882*** -0.885** -2.488*
(0.461) (1.320) (0.538) (1.161) (0.448) (1.364)
IT X FER 0.639 4.017*** 0.203 17.577*** 0.603 4.688***
(0.455) (1.499) (0.596) (2.471) (0.443) (1.562)
Observations 3,636 451 1,614 166 2,927 367
Notes: The dependent variable corresponds to a dummy that takes the value 1 if the country experienced a sudden stop in gross or
net capital inflows, and zero otherwise. For details on the definitions of the dependent and independent variables see Table 3.C.1
in appendix 3.C. Estimates are obtained using a logit model and robust standard errors clustered by country, unless otherwise
stated. Interaction terms with dummies that capture extreme values for the regressors are included in the regression. An extreme
value is defined as one that is three interquartile ranges above the 75th percentile or below the 25th percentile. Standard errors

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global Conditions
Risk 0.024*** 0.002 0.034*** -0.015 -0.012 0.014
(lagged) (0.009) (0.029) (0.010) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
Liquidity Growth -0.002 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.001
(lagged) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Growth -0.231*** -0.185 -0.323*** -0.137 -0.065 0.012
(lagged) (0.072) (0.153) (0.070) (0.124) (0.117) (0.114)
Interest Rates -0.067 0.051 -0.023 -0.055 -0.059 -0.038
(lagged) (0.055) (0.131) (0.042) (0.133) (0.125) (0.088)
Domestic Conditions
Foreign Liabilities 0.019** -0.071* 0.027*** -0.062** -0.042 0.011
(lagged, % GDP) (0.009) (0.042) (0.009) (0.032) (0.028) (0.017)
CA/TA -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.005 0.012
(lagged) (0.006) (0.015) (0.005) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010)
GDP growth -0.117*** 0.136** -0.107*** 0.087* 0.057 -0.037
(lagged) (0.024) (0.065) (0.025) (0.052) (0.050) (0.038)
Inflation 0.006 -0.261*** 0.004 -0.235*** -0.262*** -0.040
(lagged) (0.026) (0.092) (0.025) (0.083) (0.078) (0.036)
Openness -0.000 0.008 -0.002 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.004
(lagged) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Private credit by banks 0.004* -0.005 0.005*** -0.004 -0.008* 0.013***
(% of GDP, BDK) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Institutions -0.003 0.043* 0.004 0.045** 0.035* 0.016
(0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.023) (0.020) (0.013)
Contagion 0.869*** 0.281 0.698*** 0.504 0.143 0.835***
(lagged, land borders) (0.175) (0.405) (0.172) (0.457) (0.412) (0.304)
Flexible Exchange Rate (FER) -0.112 -0.305 -0.148 -0.183 0.282 -0.476
(0.200) (0.688) (0.172) (0.587) (0.542) (0.431)
Inflation Targeting (IT) -0.608 -2.551* -0.767* -2.630* -2.388* -0.325
(0.480) (1.348) (0.466) (1.354) (1.249) (0.581)
IT X FER 0.270 4.292*** 0.587 4.137*** 3.640*** 1.111
(0.525) (1.543) (0.457) (1.513) (1.391) (0.756)
Observations 3,641 392 3,577 441 438 563
Notes: The dependent variable corresponds to a dummy that takes the value 1 if the country experienced a sudden stop in gross or net capital inflows, and zero
otherwise. For details on the definitions of the dependent and independent variables see Table 3.C.1 in Appendix 3.C. Estimates are obtained using a logit model
and robust standard errors clustered by country, unless otherwise stated. Interaction terms with dummies that capture extreme values for the regressors are
included in the regression. An extreme value is defined as one that is three interquartile ranges above the 75th percentile or below the 25th percentile. Standard
errors are reported in parenthesis. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level.
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Tab. 3.4: Duration Analysis of Failed Preventions
Cox Parametric Models Cox Stratified
Model Weibull Exponetial Gompterz Filtered Emerging
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global Conditions
Risk -0.020 -0.030 -0.026 -0.023 0.019 -0.020
(lagged) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.036) (0.021)
Liquidity Growth 0.013 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.004 0.012
(lagged) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010)
Growth 0.049 0.026 0.035 0.044 0.385* 0.064
(lagged) (0.085) (0.098) (0.093) (0.088) (0.198) (0.089)
Interest Rates 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.016 -0.159 0.026
(lagged) (0.115) (0.139) (0.128) (0.118) (0.237) (0.117)
Domestic Conditions
Foreign Liabilities 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.058*** 0.036**
(lagged, % GDP) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014)
CA/TA 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.012
(first lag) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011)
GDP growth -0.008 -0.000 -0.003 -0.005 0.055 -0.040
(lagged) (0.045) (0.050) (0.047) (0.043) (0.062) (0.044)
Inflation 0.062 0.082* 0.076* 0.070* 0.161** 0.052
(lagged) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.037) (0.075) (0.036)
Openness -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(lagged) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004)
Private credit by banks -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.006 -0.004
(% of GDP, BDK) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Institutions -0.012 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 -0.042 -0.004
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.031) (0.016)
Contagion -0.291 -0.375 -0.355 -0.327 -0.163 -0.340
(lagged, trading partners) (0.326) (0.336) (0.323) (0.314) (0.627) (0.331)
Flexible Exchange Rate (FER) -0.112 -0.137 -0.113 -0.100 0.149 -0.134
(0.428) (0.520) (0.479) (0.444) (0.917) (0.422)
Inflation Targeting (IT) 0.614 0.834 0.778 0.707 1.115 0.717*
(0.480) (0.514) (0.495) (0.462) (0.898) (0.422)
IT X FER -1.610* -1.927** -1.844** -1.743** -3.169* -2.213**
(0.839) (0.948) (0.894) (0.833) (1.853) (0.881)
Observations 354 354 354 354 299 354
Notes: Denote a prevented sudden stop in a given quarter as PSS. Denote a net sudden stop in a given quarter, i.e. a sudden
stop in inflows that is not prevented, as NSS. Then, “failed prevention” corresponds to the transition PSS → NSS. For details
on the definitions of the regressors see Table 3.C.1 in Appendix 3.C. Interaction terms with dummies that capture extreme
values for the regressors are also included in the regression. An extreme value is defined as one that is three interquartile ranges
above the 75th percentile or below the 25th percentile. Estimates are obtained using clustered standard errors at the country
level to account for the fact that for each country there can be multiple unordered failure events of the same type. The Efron’s




3.A Construction of Capital Flows Series
In 2009 there was a methodological change in the construction of the Balance of
Payments (BOP) statistics, from BPM5 to BPM6. The calculation of the series
of direct investment were the most affected by this change. While BPM5 distin-
guishes between “Direct Investment Abroad” and “Direct Investment in Reporting
Economy”, BPM6 computes direct investment distinguishing between assets and
liabilities. The IMF reports the BPM5 series up to 2008 and the BPM6 series from
2005.
Due to this methodological change, the subcomponents of the financial ac-
count of the BOP (direct investment, portfolio investment and other investment)
are not comparable between BPM5 and BPM6, since BPM5 does not follow the
asset-liability criterium for the calculation of direct investment. Despite not being
able to use the subcomponents of the financial account prior to 2005, the total flows
of capital – both inflows and outflows – can still be computed because BPM5 reports
the aggregate series of asset and liability transactions.
The series of inflows and outflows are computed using the following series from
the BOP statistics reported by the IMF:
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• 1980− 2004 (BPM5)
– Assets: Total Asset Transactions
– Assets excluding reserves: Total Asset Transactions - Reserve Assets
– Liabilities: Total Liability Transactions
• 2005− 2014 (BPM6)
– Assets: Direct Investment, Assets + Portfolio Investment, Assets + Fi-
nancial Derivatives, Assets + Other Investment, Assets + Reserve Assets
– Assets excluding reserves: Assets - Reserve Assets
– Liabilities: Direct Investment, Liabilities + Portfolio Investment, Liabil-
ities + Financial Derivatives, Liabilities + Other Investment, Liabilities
The series of BPM5 and BPM6 are combined to generate assets and liabil-
ities series for the full period. Based on them, capital outflows are computed as
the negative of the assets excluding reserves, while the inflows correspond to the
liabilities.
The series of assets were disaggregated into private and public. Assets of the
public sector were computed by adding up all the asset transactions in the portfo-
lio investment, financial derivatives and other investment categories corresponding
to the general government and to the monetary authority. Asset transactions of
the private sector were computed as the difference between total asset transactions
(excluding reserves) and asset transactions of the public sector.
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3.B Country Classification
We identify 4 groups of countries: advanced economies, emerging economies, fron-
tier economies and developing economies. The groups of emerging and frontier
economies are constructed based on the S&P Dow Jones classification. The group
of Non-Advanced Economies is defined as the set of countries that are classified
either as emerging, frontier or developing economies.
Advanced Economies : Canada, United States, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New
Zealand, Singapore, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Israel and South Korea.
Emerging Economies : Greece, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mex-
ico, Peru, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Russian Federation,
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
Frontier Economies : Argentina, Ecuador, Panama, Cyprus, Jordan, Lebanon, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Vietnam, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria,
Ukraine, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovenia and Roma-
nia.
Developing Economies : Malta, Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
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duras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, The Bahamas, Aruba, Belize,
Netherlands Antilles, Suriname, Yemen, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Cabo
Verde, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Fiji, Vanuatu,
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Albania, Geor-
gia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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3.C Tables
Tab. 3.C.1: Description of Variables and Sources
Variable Definition Source
Sudden Stops




Dummy that takes de value 1 if the year-on-year change
in foreign capital inflows falls below two standard devia-
tions from its historical mean. In terms of measuring its
length in time, the sudden stop episode starts from the
moment in which the series falls one standard deviation
below its historical mean, but conditional on the fact that
it will eventually cross the two-standard-deviations thresh-
old. The episode ends when the series goes back to one




Dummy that takes de value 1 if the year-on-year change
in foreign capital net flows falls below two standard de-
viations from its historical mean. In terms of measuring
its length in time, the sudden stop episode starts from
the moment in which the series falls one standard devia-
tion below its historical mean, but conditional on the fact
that it will eventually cross the two-standard-deviations
threshold. The episode ends when the series goes back to
one standard deviation below the historical mean.
Constructed by authors.
Continues in next page
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Table 3.C.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Terms of Trade 100*(Price of Exports / Price of Imports).
This variable is used to compute sudden stop
episodes associated with bonanzas.
Sovereign Bond Spreads Emerging Countries: From 1991, JPM EMBI Composite.
Before 1991, effective Fed Funds rate.
Developing Countries: Average Euro-area government
bond spread over German 10-year government bond.
Developed Countries: From 1995, G7 government bond
spread over US Treasury bonds. Before 1995, German 10-
year government bond spread over US Treasury bonds.
This measure is used to compute systemic sudden
stop episodes.
EMBI from Bloomberg.
Effective Fed Funds rate
from FRED.
Government bond






GDP Growth Year-on-year growth rate of real GDP. IFS.
CPI Inflation Year-on-year growth rate of CPI. IFS. When note avail-
able, CPI inflation
was obtained from
local sources and from
Datastream.
CAD Current account deficit. BOPS (both BPM5 and
BPM6), IMF.
Continues in next page
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Imports plus tradable output domestically consumed mi-
nus exports. Tradable output domestically consumed is
constructed as the share of tradable output multiplied by
GDP. The share of tradable output is computed as the
ratio of agriculture plus industrial output to total GDP.
The obtained series are deflated using the implicit GDP
deflator.
Imports, exports and
GDP in local currency at
current prices from IFS
(National Accounts).
Agriculture and indus-
trial value added as





Trade Openness Exports plus imports as percentage of GDP. Exports, Imports and
GDP in local currency at
current prices from IFS
(National Accounts).
DLD Domestic Liability Dollarization.
Emerging and Developing countries: Bank foreign bor-
rowing as a share of GDP.
Developed countries: Banks’ local asset positions in for-
eign currency (vis-a-vis the non-bank sector) as a share of
GDP.
Bank foreign borrowing
from IFS (line 26c).
Banks’ local asset posi-
tions in foreign currency
from BIS. GDP in US
dollars from WEO, IMF.
Private Credit I Deposit money banks and other financial institutions
claims on the private sector as a percentage of GDP.
Claims on the private
sector from IFS (lines
22d and 42d). GDP in
local currency at current
prices from IFS.
Private Credit II Bank credit to private sector as percentage of GDP. Beck et al. (2009)
Continues in next page
153
Table 3.C.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Private Credit III Deposit money banks and other financial institutions
claims on the private sector as a percentage of total de-
posits. Total deposits correspond to demand, time and
saving deposits in deposit money banks and other finan-
cial institutions.
Claims on the private
sector from IFS (lines
22d and 42d). Financial
system deposits from IFS
(lines 24, 25, and 45).
Private Credit IV Bank credit to private sector as percentage of total bank
deposits.
Beck et al. (2009)
Regional Contagion Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country
reports a sudden stop in t and there is at least one country
with geographic proximity with a sudden stop in t− 1.
Constructed by authors.
Trade Contagion Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country
reports a sudden stop in t and there is at least one top 10
trading partner with a sudden stop in t− 1.
Constructed by authors.
Institutional Quality Sum of the following components: rule of law, investment






Index that measures a country’s ability to finance its of-
ficial, commercial, and trade debt obligations. Its com-
ponents are: foreign debt as percentage of GDP, foreign
debt service as percentage of exports of goods and ser-
vices, current account as percentage of exports of goods
and services, net international liquidity as months of im-
port cover, exchange rate stability.
Political Risk Services
Group.
Depth of Financial Sys-
tem
Stock market capitalization as percentage of GDP. Annual
frequency.
Beck et al. (2009)
Continues in next page
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Exchange Rate Regime Monthly fine classification (1-15) of countries according to





Public Debt Public debt as percentage of GDP. Annual frequency. Abbas et al. (2010)
International Investment
Position





Global Risk US stock market volatility. Bloom (2009). VXO in-
dex updated from CBOE
website.
Growth Rate of Global
Money Supply
Average of the year-on-year growth rate of M2 in the
United States, M2 in the Eurozone, M2 in Japan and M4
in the UK.
IFS.
Global Interest Rates Average rate on long-term government bonds in the
United States, Euro area and Japan
IFS.
Global Growth Year-on-year growth rate of World’s real GDP. IFS.
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Tab. 3.C.2: “Prevented” Sudden Stop Episodes
Country Start End Country Start End Country Start End
Advanced Economies Italy 1995q1 1995q1 United States 1998q2 1998q3
Australia 1990q1 1991q1 Italy 2000q4 2002q3 United States 1999q2 1999q2
Australia 1998q1 1998q1 Italy 2007q3 2009q2 United States 2001q3 2001q3
Australia 2001q4 2002q1 Japan 1990q4 1991q3 United States 2008q3 2009q1
Australia 2005q1 2005q4 Japan 1992q4 1993q1 United States 2012q1 2012q1
Australia 2008q3 2008q3 Japan 1996q3 1996q4 Frontier, Emerging and Developing Economies
Australia 2009q1 2009q3 Japan 1998q3 1999q1 Albania 2012q3 2013q2
Australia 2012q2 2012q3 Japan 2008q3 2009q4 Argentina 1989q1 1989q1
Austria 1993q3 1993q3 Korea 1997q3 1997q3 Argentina 1998q4 1999q2
Austria 2001q1 2002q1 Korea 1998q4 1999q1 Armenia 2001q1 2001q3
Austria 2008q4 2009q4 Korea 2009q3 2009q3 Aruba 2012q4 2012q4
Belgium 2006q1 2006q3 Luxembourg 2008q2 2009q2 Azerbaijan 2009q1 2009q4
Belgium 2008q4 2009q4 Netherlands 1991q1 1991q4 Bahamas 1989q2 1990q1
Canada 2008q4 2009q2 Netherlands 1994q4 1994q4 Bahamas 1995q3 1996q2
Hong Kong 2008q3 2009q3 Netherlands 2002q1 2002q1 Bahamas 2003q2 2004q3
Denmark 1986q4 1987q2 Netherlands 2008q1 2009q3 Belarus 2008q4 2009q1
Denmark 1991q3 1991q3 Netherlands 2010q4 2011q3 Belarus 2013q1 2013q1
Denmark 1992q3 1993q2 New Zealand 2005q3 2005q3 Bolivia 2000q2 2000q2
Denmark 1994q3 1995q1 New Zealand 2008q2 2008q3 Bolivia 2004q4 2005q1
Denmark 2001q2 2002q2 New Zealand 2012q1 2012q3 Bolivia 2006q2 2006q2
Denmark 2008q4 2009q4 Norway 1983q4 1983q4 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005q1 2005q1
Denmark 2011q3 2011q4 Norway 1988q3 1988q4 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008q3 2008q4
Finland 1992q1 1992q2 Norway 1991q3 1991q4 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010q2 2010q3
Finland 2001q1 2001q4 Norway 2002q1 2002q2 Brazil 1995q1 1995q2
Finland 2003q1 2003q3 Norway 2008q1 2008q2 Brazil 2002q3 2003q2
Finland 2005q3 2005q3 Norway 2009q3 2010q1 Brazil 2008q2 2008q3
Finland 2009q2 2009q3 Portugal 1983q4 1984q2 Cabo Verde 2009q3 2009q3
Finland 2012q3 2012q4 Portugal 1992q3 1992q3 Cabo Verde 2013q1 2013q3
France 2002q1 2002q3 Portugal 1996q2 1996q3 Cambodia 1997q4 1998q1
France 2008q2 2008q3 Portugal 2002q4 2003q1 Cambodia 2010q1 2010q1
France 2009q1 2009q1 Portugal 2004q4 2005q2 Chile 2000q2 2001q1
France 2011q4 2012q3 Portugal 2008q2 2009q3 Chile 2008q4 2009q2
Germany 1988q1 1988q2 Portugal 2010q4 2011q1 Chile 2013q4 2014q1
Germany 1994q2 1994q4 Singapore 1998q4 1998q4 Costa Rica 2008q4 2008q4
Germany 2001q1 2002q2 Singapore 2008q3 2009q3 Croatia 2005q1 2005q3
Germany 2004q1 2004q2 Spain 1994q2 1995q1 Croatia 2010q3 2010q3
Germany 2008q2 2009q4 Spain 2001q3 2002q2 Croatia 2011q1 2011q1
Germany 2013q4 2013q4 Spain 2008q2 2008q4 Cyprus 2008q2 2008q2
Iceland 1989q2 1989q4 Sweden 1991q2 1991q2 Cyprus 2010q1 2010q1
Iceland 2002q2 2002q2 Sweden 1996q4 1997q3 Cyprus 2010q4 2011q2
Iceland 2008q2 2009q1 Sweden 2001q1 2002q3 Czech Republic 2006q2 2006q4
Ireland 1991q4 1992q1 Sweden 2008q4 2009q2 Czech Republic 2008q4 2009q4
Continues in next page
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Table 3.C.2 – continued from previous page
Country Start End Country Start End Country Start End
Ireland 1994q4 1994q4 Switzerland 2008q1 2009q1 El Salvador 2009q1 2009q1
Ireland 2008q2 2008q4 United Kingdom 1991q4 1992q2 Estonia 2008q2 2008q2
Israel 2001q1 2001q2 United Kingdom 1994q2 1994q4 Ethiopia 2005q3 2005q4
Israel 2002q1 2002q2 United Kingdom 1998q1 1998q4 Fiji 2005q1 2005q1
Israel 2007q3 2009q2 United Kingdom 2001q3 2002q4 Fiji 2012q1 2012q4
Israel 2011q4 2012q1 United Kingdom 2008q2 2009q3 Greece 2006q2 2006q3
Italy 1993q1 1993q3 United States 1990q2 1990q4 Greece 2010q2 2010q3
Greece 2014q1 2014q1 Malaysia 2008q3 2008q3 Russian Federation 1998q3 1999q4
Guatemala 2008q4 2008q4 Malta 2000q1 2000q3 Russian Federation 2009q4 2009q4
Hungary 2002q4 2002q4 Malta 2009q4 2009q4 Russian Federation 2014q1 2014q3
Hungary 2009q1 2009q3 Mauritius 2008q3 2009q2 Samoa 2010q1 2010q1
India 1992q2 1992q4 Mauritius 2012q2 2013q2 Samoa 2013q3 2013q3
India 1998q4 1998q4 Mexico 2008q4 2009q3 Seychelles 1987q3 1988q1
India 2001q4 2002q3 Morocco 2009q1 2009q3 Seychelles 2009q2 2009q2
Indonesia 2006q4 2007q1 Namibia 2002q4 2003q2 Slovak Republic 1998q2 1999q1
Jordan 1992q3 1992q3 Namibia 2008q1 2008q1 Slovak Republic 1999q4 1999q4
Jordan 2007q3 2007q4 Namibia 2010q3 2011q2 Slovak Republic 2010q2 2010q4
Jordan 2008q3 2008q4 Nepal 1986q4 1987q1 Slovak Republic 2012q2 2012q4
Jordan 2011q4 2012q1 Nepal 1990q2 1991q1 Slovenia 1997q3 1997q4
Jordan 2012q3 2012q3 Nepal 1995q4 1996q1 Slovenia 2008q3 2009q1
Kazakhstan 2009q1 2009q1 Nepal 2009q4 2010q1 South Africa 2008q3 2008q3
Kyrgyz Republic 2010q2 2011q1 Netherlands Antilles 2002q4 2003q1 Sri Lanka 1994q2 1994q3
Lao PDR 2008q3 2008q4 Netherlands Antilles 2009q2 2009q2 Sri Lanka 1995q4 1996q1
Lao PDR 2012q1 2012q1 Pakistan 2012q2 2012q4 Sri Lanka 1998q4 1999q1
Lao PDR 2013q2 2013q3 Panama 2002q1 2002q4 Sri Lanka 2013q3 2014q1
Latvia 1998q3 1999q2 Panama 2008q4 2009q1 Tajikistan 2009q3 2009q3
Lesotho 1989q3 1989q4 Papua New Guinea 1992q4 1992q4 Thailand 1996q3 1996q3
Lithuania 2000q4 2001q3 Paraguay 2007q3 2007q4 Thailand 2008q4 2009q3
Lithuania 2008q3 2008q3 Paraguay 2009q4 2009q4 Tonga 2008q3 2009q2
Lithuania 2013q1 2013q1 Philippines 1997q3 1997q3 Ukraine 2008q4 2008q4
Macedonia 2002q1 2002q2 Philippines 2008q2 2009q1 Ukraine 2010q1 2010q1
Macedonia 2002q4 2002q4 Poland 1991q4 1992q2 Vanuatu 2009q2 2010q1
Macedonia 2012q2 2012q2 Poland 2008q4 2008q4 Venezuela 2012q2 2012q4
Macedonia 2013q4 2014q2 Romania 2012q3 2012q3
Note: A “prevented” sudden stop in economy j during period t in an event in which a sudden stop in gross inflows does not translate
into a sudden stops in net flows due to the offsetting variation in capital outflows from domestic agents. A prevented sudden stop
episode is conceived as one or more consecutive periods (quarters) in which a sudden stop in net flows does not coexist with a sudden
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